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VOLUME 64 OCTOBER 1978 NUMBER 6
SIGNIFICANT PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS AND THE NEED
FOR PUBLIC SELECTION OF THEIR TRUSTEES
David A. Lipton*
Every generation regards as natural the institutions to which it is
accustomed.
R. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 91 (1964 ed.)
N February of 1965, the United States Treasury Department
issued a Report on Private Foundations,' investigating possible
improper activities of private foundations in their philanthropic
operations. The Report primarily discussed six areas in the opera-
tions of private foundations for which it recommended corrective
legislation.2 Nearly five years later, after eleven months of consider-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; on leave 1978-1979 for
service with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the SEC or of the author's colleagues
on the staff of the SEC.
I U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TREASURY DEP'T REPORT ON PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY REPORT]. The Department
prepared the REPORT at the request of the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Ways and Means. The recommendations contained in the REPORT were pre-
sented again to Congress during the hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.). See STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS & STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS.,
TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T 26 (Comm. Print 1969)
[hereinafter cited as JoINT COMM. REPORr.
I Broadly, these discussions and recommendations dealt with the problems of (1) self-
dealing between foundations and donors or related parties, (2) delays between the granting
of deductions for specific contributions and the receipt of the benefit of these contributions
by the public, (3) involvement of foundations in the operation and control of business enter-
prises resulting in competitive advantages and opportunities for subtle self-dealing, (4) con-
trol of business enterprises by donors or their families through ownership by a foundation of
these enterprises, (5) financial transactions by foundations that are unrelated to their charita-
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ation, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969.3 A substantial
portion of this'legislation dealt with private foundations and was
designed to respond to the abuses highlighted in the 1965 Report.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 has been credited with successfully
eliminating many of the abuses associated with private founda-
tions.' Indeed, the pertinent portions of the legislation focused on
all the problems raised in the Treasury Report with one notable
exception: the self-perpetuating influence and narrow base of repre-
sentation of the governing bodies of foundations.
While the Act has greatly curbed the potential for misconduct by
private foundations, the basic operational system of the private
foundation remains essentially unaltered. The structure of this sys-
tem is at odds with several essential underlying values of our so-
ciety. This system is devoid of any mandatory public input into a
decisionmaking process that determines how the $30,000,000,000 of
foundations' assets and $2,000,000,000 of annual distributions6 that
ble function, and (6) perpetual control of foundations by donors or their families and the
corresponding lack of independent evaluation of a foundation's operations. See TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-9, 15-57. The interest of the Treasury Department in investigating
these problems arose from the favorable federal tax treatment provided private foundations
as charitable institutions, which the Department viewed as serving to "encourage and, in
substantial measure, finance private charity." Id. at 1.
Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.).
In 1973, at the initiative of individuals such as John D. Rockefeller, I, Wilbur D. Mills,
George P. Shultz, and William E. Simon, a privately funded commission was established
to study philanthropy in the United States. The Commission on Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs (commonly called the Filer Commission after its chairman, John H. Filer) has
produced more than 70 original research papers dealing with philanthropy. The Commission's
report was published in 1975. See COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING
IN AMERICA (1975) [hereinafter cited as FILER COMM'N REPORT]. The supporting papers for
this report, written by scholars and experts in fields such as health, education, sociology,
economics, and law, were published by the Department of the Treasury in 1977 in a five
volume collection. RESEARCH PAPERS (U.S. Dep't of Treasury ed. 1977). This collection repre-
sents the most complete study ever made of charities and private foundations. One of the
studies in this collection, prepared by the Council on Foundations, Inc., a nonprofit organiza-
tion functioning as a trade association for foundations, concludes that "there is an informal
consensus that [the Tax Reform Act of 1969] has in fact removed much of the potential for
abuse" by foundations. Chairman and Staff, Council on Foundations, Inc., Private Founda-
tions and the 1969 Tax Reform Act, in 3 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra at 1557, 1565.
5 Some commentators have stated that lobbying by significant foundations ultimately
defeated the legislation designed to deal with this problem. See text accompanying note 162
infra.
' These figures are aggregates for all foundations listed in FOUNDATION CENTER, THE FOUN-
DATION DIRECTORY (6th ed. 1977), plus those foundations not meeting the size requirements
of the DIRECTORY but whose assets are estimatable from statistics given in the introduction
to the DIRECTORY, id. at xi.
The figures for assets and grants used later in this afticle, see note 25 infra and accompany-
ing text, include only "significant private foundations" and exclude community, company,
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have been dedicated to benefiting the public should be used. Typi-
cally, it provides for a self-appointing, self-perpetuating governing
structure, often parochial in composition, that need not answer to
any shareholder, customer, union member, or voter in managing the
foundation.7 It allots to self-appointing trustees total discretion in
administering wealth that has a vast impact upon society's ordering
of its priorities in the areas of science, art, education, social policy,
international development, and communications. Through tax de-
ductions and exemptions, this system permits funds otherwise des-
tined for the public treasury to accumulate instead as private foun-
dations' wealth to be spent as determined by a nonpublicly selected
management. The programs of this system are frequently under
attack from groups across the political spectrum because of the lack
of legitimacy of the governing structure that develops those pro-
grams. Finally, this system perhaps suffers from internal adminis-
trative inefficiencies caused by its very self-selecting nature.
Private foundations thus represent a unique instance in American
society of an influential governing body that is neither selected by
nor responsible to any constituency.8 To those concerned about the
power of foundations and their lack of public input, these institu-
tions are unfettered by the normal restraints of ownership or public
responsibility in their control of assets.9 Even proponents of the
government, and the small private foundations not included in the DIRECTORY. See generally
notes 14-29 infra and accompanying text.
7 To say that no mandatory public input into the governance of foundations exists is not
to ignore state supervision of the trustees in carrying out their duties. This supervision,
however, whether effective or otherwise, relates to patent abuses of position rather than day-
to-day direction of the foundation. The lack of input with which this article is concerned
centers on the ordinary regulation of foundations, not on extraordinary instances of abuse.
For discussion of supervision of foundations by instrumentalities of the state, see M.
FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 194-408 (1965); Fremont-Smith, Duties and
Powers of Charitable Fiduciaries: The Law of Trusts and The Correction of Abuses, 13
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1041 (1966); Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled
State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960); Office of Ohio Att'y Gen., The Status of
State Regulation of Charitable Trusts, Foundations, and Solicitations, in 5 RESEARCH PAPERS,
supra note 4, at 2705; Note, The Modern Philanthropic Foundation: A Critique and a
Proposal, 59 YALE L.J. 477, 483-85 (1950).
1 In certain respects, the lack of control over the governing boards of private foundations
can be likened to a similar lack of control over corporate management. See generally A. BER=.
& G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-118 (1932). Whereas Berle
and Means focused on the inability of the owners to effect control over the corporate entity,
private foundations have no group of owners from which control has to be divorced. They have
only a self-selected, nonaccountable controlling group that operates without restraint by or
direction from any constituent body as long as it does not abuse its fiduciary duty. See
generally notes 132-37 infra and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., COMM'N ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY, FOUNDATIONS, PRIVATE
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present structure of foundations admit, albeit approvingly, that
they function similarly to "private 'legislators.' "10 Accordingly, the
one area of abuse identified by the Treasury Report in 1965 but not
dealt with by the Tax Reform Act of 1969-the inadequacies in the
selection process of the governing bodies of private founda-
tions-remains a serious concern today.
1
The governing model customarily employed by private founda-
tions is by no means necessary. One can find avenues to follow in
establishing a governing board other than those leading to self-
perpetuation and lack of public input. An extremely limited num-
ber of private foundations have established governing systems that
guarantee a degree of public impact in the selection of trustees and
that avoid the establishment of a "co-optive"' 2 governing board.
Foundations other than private foundations utilize modes of gover-
nance readily transferable to private foundations that would enable
them to avoid the limitations of the present co-optive system. Fi-
nally, alternative models for selecting governing officials employed
in other institutional frameworks could be adapted to the private
foundation. These other available forms of governance are explored
as alternatives to the present system.13
To place these issues in proper perspective, this article first exam-
ines what constitutes a private foundation and then assesses its
impact on social policy. After an exploration of the implications of
the present tax treatment of foundations, this article turns to defi-
ciencies in organizational structure and models of governance allow-
ing for input by the public. These models are proposed because their
operations conform more to the underlying values of society than do
GmNG, AND PUBLIC PoLICY 67 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PETERSON COMM'N REPORT].
1s Mavity & Ylvisaker, Private Philanthropy and Public Affairs, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS,
supra note 4, at 795, 798.
" To be entirely accurate, it must be stated that the deficiencies that this article notes in
the present governing structure of private foundations probably are more extensive than the
deficiencies outlined in the TREAsuaY REPoRT, supra note 1, though they have similar themes.
The TRESURY REPORT was concerned with the self-perpetuation of a donor's influence through
self-selection of the board of trustees. See generally note 2 supra. This article focuses on that
problem of self-perpetuation within the broader context of lack of public input in the selection
process.
12 For a definition of the term "co-optive" as used in this context, see D. YouNG & W.
MOORE, TRUSTEESHIP AND THE MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS 19 (1969) (current trustees choose
their own successors).
" This article does not discuss the advantages of any of the alternative governing structures
in terms of the grant programs or investment policies that might be developed under them.




foundations guided by self-selected officers. These values basically
dictate that the public as a whole, not a self-appointed body of
governors, should play the major role in determining what consti-
tutes and best serves the common welfare. In addition, in the pro-
cess of satisfying these external values, some demonstrable internal
efficiencies accrue to foundations in terms of both the development
of more vibrant and representative governing structures and the
encouragement of a number of administrative efficiencies.
I. WHAT Is A PRIVATE FOUNDATION?
A. Foundations in General
Before discussing the impact of private foundations and how they
are governed, a definition of the precise entity to be studied and an
indication of the significance of what is included within and what
is excluded from that definition are necessary. The most frequently
cited definition of a foundation is that developed by F. Emerson
Andrews, former director of and now consultant to the Foundation
Center. 4 He defined a foundation as "a nongovernmental, nonprofit
organization, having a principal fund of its own, managed by its own
trustees or directors, and established to maintain or aid social, edu-
cational, charitable, religious, or other activities serving the com-
mon welfare."' 5
The Andrews definition, either expressly or implicitly, captures
the factors that distinguish foundations from other charitable or-
ganizations. First, any definition of foundations would have to in-
clude a reference to their purpose of serving the public welfare.
Historically, this public purpose has been a major component in any
description of a foundation."5 Second and equally important is the
"1 The Foundation Center is a not-for-profit corporation chartered in 1956 and supported
largely by foundations. It gathers and disseminates information on foundations. See Founda-
tion Center, Annual Report-1976, at 5 (1977) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association).
, F. ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 11 (1956).
" John Stuart Mill understood a foundation to be "money or money's worth (most com-
monly land) assigned, in perpetuity or for some long period, for a public purpose . . . " J.
MILL, The Right and Wrong of State Interference with Corporation and Church Property, in
1 DISSEirrATIONS AND DisCUSSIONS: POLMCICAL, PILosOPiCAL, AND HisrToicAL 26, 30 (1874)
(emphasis added). A more recent commentator addressed himself to the public nature of
foundations in explaining why he considered the term "private!' to be an incorrect modifier
of "foundations." Merrimon Cuninggim, former president of the Danforth Foundation,
argued that foundation "funds are not private, for the money no longer belongs to the original
donor, whoever he is. Rather, it is public money, set aside to be so by an uncommon act of
stewardship on the part of the donor." M. CUNINGOIM, PRIVATE MONEY AND PUtuc SERVICE 4
(1972) (emphasis added). See generally pp. 795-802 infra.
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foundation's endowed status. Because private foundations own
income-producing property, often donated by a single source, they
are insulated from the burdens and restrictions of maintaining the
degree of popular acceptability necessary to those organizations
that regularly or periodically raise operating funds.1 7 As long as the
foundation's securities and other properties produce adequate in-
come, it can operate independently of any funding body free from
"worry about the impact of its activities on contributions."18 Fur-
thermore, because a prudently invested endowment will produce a
roughly predictable amount of income, foundations can promise and
provide financial support to those entities they view as worthy of
such encouragement.
A third essential element in the definition of a foundation is that
it funds the activities of others. It is a grant-making institution
rather than one operating its own charity or functioning as a
"feeder" organization to support a specific charitable operation.
This crucial aspect of its activities partially explains the influence
of a foundation. It does not have to meet the exigencies of maintain-
ing an individual school or hospital or research center. Rather, a
foundation is free to do with its funds as it sees fit.19 Although
foundations can and do make long-range commitments as to grants,
they have no operating activities to sustain. Because they have no
budgets to meet and no obligation to absorb inflationary operating
costs, foundations are free to reduce grants during tight financial
times.20 The foundation recognizes that fewer recipients will receive
11 An endowment is not an essential element of all definitions of foundations. The Peterson
Commission did not include the requirement of an endowment in its definition. Instead, it
categorized a charitable organization as a foundation as long as its sources of contributions
were "relatively narrow," allowing it to be free from concern over the impact its activities
have on contributions. PETr ON COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 9, at 40-41.
The Commission, chaired by Peter G. Peterson, was encouraged by John D. Rockefeller,
I, and Alan Pifer, President of the Carnegie Corporation, funded by private, nonfoundation
sources, and formed to study "all relevant matters bearing on foundations and private philan-
thropy." Id. at 3. Its report is one of the two or three most comprehensive recent studies of
foundations and charitable organizations.
19 Id. at 41.
1' This proposition is true so long as the purposes to which the funds are dedicated fall
within the frequently broad confines of the foundation's charter or trust instrument. The
potential breadth of these governing documents is aptly demonstrated by the articles of
incorporation of the Ford Foundation, the largest private foundation. Article 2 reads: "The
purpose or purposes of this corporation are as follows: A. To receive and administer funds
for scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare . . . ." Ford
Foundation Art. of Incorporation art. 2 (1936) (emphasis in original) (copy on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
" For instance, the Ford Foundation in 1976 expended $150,900,000 for programs, as op-
[Vol. 64:779
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as much as in the past; at the same time it understands that the
foundation itself will continue in its role of determining which recip-
ients are to receive what funds.
B. Distinguishing Private Foundations
Although the term "foundation" can include community founda-
tions, governmental foundations, and corporation foundations as
well as private foundations, the focus of this article is on the latter.
Private foundations can be distinguished from the three other types
both by funding source and by governing structure.1
Community foundations, a variant first given form in 1914 in
Cleveland, Ohio,2 are trusts designed to benefit a specific city or
limited geographic area. They are governed by a broadly representa-
tive board and typically are funded by a larger group of donors than
private foundations. A local banking institution generally manages
the actual investments.
Governmental foundations are limited in number, being estab-
lished and financed by the United States government. Among the
best known is the National Science Foundation. Government offi-
cials select the governing boards of these foundations. Their opera-
tions are funded annually as part of the federal budget as opposed
to a private foundation, the income of which is derived from a cor-
pus.
Corporation foundations differ from private foundations in that
they rarely have a significant endowment and more often function
on current donations from a specific company. The board of trustees
consists mainly or totally of officers and directors of the funding
corporation. They often are a device for evening out corporate giving
by distributing grants at a constant rate while receiving less from
their corporate donor in a bad year and more in a good year.
posed to $195,200,000 expended in 1975, a reduction of nearly 25%. See Ford Foundation,
Annual Report 64 (1976) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). The Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation, the nation's second largest private foundation in terms of total
assets, made grants totalling a little over $43,000,000 in 1976, as compared to $54,000,000 in
1975. See Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Annual Report 39 (1976) (copy on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
21 For more on the distinction between these types of foundations, see F. ANDREws, supra
note 15, at 21-37; ParERSON COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 9, at 47-53; A. ZuRcHER, THm MANAGE-
MENT OF AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS: AmmNISTRArION, PoLIcis AND SocL RoLE 17-29, 119-42
(1972) (the late Alfred Zurcher was the former executive director of the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation).




Because of the manner in which these other-than-private founda-
tions are funded and governed, this article has less concern with
their operations. They do have constituencies to which they must
answer, both in terms of future funding and present governance.
Consequently, in this article they primarily serve as a source of
comparison.
23
C. Significant Private Foundations
The United States presently has about 26,000 private grant-
making and community foundations. Of these, eighty-five percent
are small foundations with neither assets exceeding $1,000,000 nor
annual grants in excess of $100,000.4 Apart from these smaller foun-
dations and the community and company foundations, roughly
2,300 foundations fall in the category of "significant" private foun-
dations. Together, these 2,300 significant private foundations con-
trol nearly $26,000,000,000 of assets and make annual grants total-
ing $1,500,000,000.5
The total assets of these significant private foundations exceed
the individual assets of nearly all the top 500 American corporations
ranked according to assets.2 As a group, private foundations hold
about thirteen percent of corporate stock held by institutional
* I.R.C. § 509 also draws a distinction between "private foundations" and all other founda-
tions. Those organizations "excluded from the definition of 'private foundation' are generally
those which either have broad public support or actively function in a supporting relationship
to such organizations." Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-i (1972). The exclusion provisions of § 509
eliminate most corporation and community foundations and all governmental foundations
from the definition of "private foundations." The term "private foundation" is refined further
by I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3), which distinguishes between "operating" and "nonoperating" founda-
tions. Operating foundations are essentially those foundations that devote most of their
earnings and assets directly to the conduct of a charitable activity, as distinguished from
making grants to other charitable organizations that in turn conduct the activity. Thus the
Code's counterpart to the term "private foundation" as used herein would be the "private,
nonoperating foundation."
11 See FoUNDATION CENTER, supra note 6, at ix-xxv.
25 Id. at xi. The $1,000,000 of assets or $100,000 of annual grants is an arbitrary cutoff used
by the Foundation Center in determining which foundations are too small to be included in
its directory. Id. This article adopts these criteria because the focus here is on foundations
capable of having a significant impact on society. Accordingly, when the text refers to
"foundations," it means these significant foundations unless otherwise noted.
" This comparison is based on the ranking of the top 500 American corporations appearing
in The Forbes Assets 500, FoRBEs, May 15, 1977, at 165, 165-72. This listing was modified to
exclude all banking corporations before making the comparison to private foundations. The
two corporations of greater magnitude are AT&T and Exxon. Among the corporations over-
shadowed by the total assets of all significant foundations are General Motors, Mobil Oil,
and IBM. See id. at 165.
[Vol. 64:779
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stockholders (excluding family and individual trusts).- Moreover,
the actual magnitude of holdings of foundations probably is under-
stated significantly. The Peterson Commission 8 reported in 1970
that many foundations carried their assets at cost or some other
basis rather than at market value. This led the commission to sug-
gest that the estimate of foundations' assets prepared by the Foun-
dation Center was probably low. 29 The sheer size of these assets
necessitates an inquiry into the impact of these institutions.
II. THE IMPACT OF SIGNIFICANT PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
A. Breadth of Grants
The grants that significant private foundations distribute each
year equal more than double the annual budget of the United Na-
tions and exceed the individual budgets of two-fifths of the state
governments in America.30 Since its inception, the Ford Foundation
alone has distributed more than $4,960,000,000.31 Because these dis-
tributions often are intended to effectuate very broad and general
purposes, a wide range of recipients both domestic and abroad feel
the impact of the grants. The full range of fields in which founda-
tions wield influence is hard to fathom. The Ford Foundation alone
categorizes the grants it makes into fifty-eight different areas. 2 Its
1976 annual report took fifty-seven pages merely to list and to de-
scribe briefly what organizations received the $156,700,000 distrib-
uted in 1975. 3 Three additional pages were devoted solely to listing
"some" publications assisted by grants during the preceding year.34
Although the Ford Foundation is unique in that it has more than
twice the assets of the next largest foundation, it is not unlike other
private foundations in terms of the breadth of its influence. The
Carnegie Corporation of New York, ranked tenth in terms of grants
27 See R. NELSON, THE INVESTMENT POLICY OF FOUNDATIONS 6 (1967).
21 See generally note 17 supra.
2 PETERSON CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 49. For a recent confirmation that founda-
tions still largely carry their assets at cost, see J. TRAuB, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING PRACTICES
OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 67 (1977).
Compare text accompanying note 25 supra with THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS
78, 597 (1978).
21 Weymouth, Foundation Woes, The Saga of Henry Ford II (pt. 2), N.Y. Times, Mar. 12,
1978, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
22 The Ford Foundation distinguishes between eight broad fields of programs, which are
further broken down into 58 subcategories. See Ford Foundation, supra note 20, at 1.
" See id. at 2-58.
See id. at 59-61.
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by the Foundation Center,35 appropriated $12,894,659 for the year
ending September 30, 1976, to forty-two educational institutions,
sixty-seven other organizations, four internally administered proj-
ects, one fund for disseminating publications, and one fund for
evaluating programs. 8
The international as well as domestic influence of foundations is
readily apparent. Although grants in the international sphere are
made primarily by the larger foundations, such as Ford, Rockefeller,
Kellogg, Carnegie, Lilly, and Clark, total giving by foundations to
international activities approximates $200,000,000 annually.37
B. Influence Through Decisions About Investments
The economic impact of private foundations also arises from ac-
tivities besides grants. Together, the significant private foundations
control $26,000,000,000 of invested assets .3  These assets provide
foundations with influence, which can be exercised both in deter-
mining where to place an investment and in having potential clout
with the business entity in which the investment is made.
Ironically, the influence of foundations is manifested primarily by
not using their discretion as to where to place investments, which
leads to a bifurcation between the goals of programs and the goals
of investments. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 allowed foundations to
make investments with socially oriented goals without fear of being
penalized for carrying investments that would otherwise place their
tax-exempt status in jeopardy. 9 Nevertheless, one study, prepared
'5 FOUNDATION CENTER, supra note 6, at xxi, tab. 7.
1' See Carnegie Corp. of N.Y., Annual Report 21 (1976) (copy on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association). The purpose of the Carnegie Corporation is stated as "the advancement
and diffusion of knowledge and understanding," Carnegie Corp. of N.Y. Const. art. 2, § 1
(1911) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association), which has been interpreted
to mean that grants should be educational in nature but not limited to formal educational
programs. See generally Carnegie Corp. of N.Y., supra at 22-24.
Yarmolinsky, Philanthropic Activity in International Affairs, in 2 REsEARCH PAPERS,
supra note 4, at 761, 762.
" See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1) prescribes a tax of five percent of any amount invested by a private
foundation that would jeopardize the foundation's carrying out any of its tax-exempt pur-
poses. Trees. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (1972) provides that an investment jeopardizes a founda-
tion's tax-exempt status if ordinary business care and prudence were not used in making the
investment. Elements to be considered in determining the requisite duty of care for any
investment include expected return, risk, and need for diversification. Id.
I.R.C. § 4944(c), however, exempts from the above tax those investments the significant
purpose of which is not production of income or appreciation of property but rather furthering
the charitable purposes of the foundation. Examples cited in the regulations include loans at
low interest rates to minority-owned businesses in deteriorated urban areas or to profitable
[Vol. 64:779
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in the early 1970's for the Ford Foundation, indicated that it could
find no rush among foundations to establish such socially oriented
investments." The explanation given in the report for the lack of
overlap between investment goals (maximizing returns) and pro-
gram goals (fulfilling the donor's purpose) is the foundation's moti-
vation to maximize returns on investment and thereby maximize its
ability to make grants.4' Another reason is that the portfolios of
some foundations are so undiversified as to make social goals an
unrealistic consideration in decisions about investments.42 Addi-
tionally, many foundations delegate the direction of investment
strategy and the formulation of program goals to different staff
members, which adds to difficulty in combining the two.43 Other
foundations leave their investment policies to the discretion of a
bank." Finally, unless excused from the duty by way of the trust
instrument or statute, trustees of foundations have an obligation to
invest the foundation's corpus in the manner that a "prudent man"
would invest his own property. 5 Although such proscriptions do not
rule out program-related investments, they do discourage the more
risky ones."
However reasonable these justifications for the lack of overlap
may be, the net result is that many foundations do not utilize their
discretion as to investments to further specific social goals. A choice
has been made, whether consciously or by default, to exclude from
the services that foundations provide society those benefits gener-
ated by a socially oriented investment of $26,000,000,000. Thus the
impact that these foundations exert through their decisions to in-
businesses to induce them to establish operations in deteriorated urban areas, and interest-
free loans to disadvantaged individuals to attend college. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) (1972).
11 B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILrY AND THE INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR 55 (1973). The authors noted:
There does not appear to be a widespread sense of urgency among foundations with
regard to the social aspects of investment policy. One reason for this may be that
foundations, although under Congressional scrutiny from time to time, are not subject
to the constant pressures of a close, large, and vocal constituency.
Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 56. In one sense, the eventual expenditure of return on investments for grants
reunites programs and investment. Overlap in this sense, however, does not have as much
impact as an investment policy designed specifically to achieve program goals.
42 See id. at 55.
"' See A. ZURCHER, supra note 21, at 100.
" See B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 40, at 55.
3 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 227.3 (3d ed. 1967); 4 id. § 389.
" See ABA Comm. on Charitable Trusts, Investing Charitable Funds to Eliminate
Poverty, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 355 (1969).
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vest is in part a nonimpact, a nonuse of assets for program-related
investments.
By contrast, some foundations have followed a course that leads
to a degree of program-related investments by choosing to exercise
their influence toward achieving social goals through investment
policies. In 1968, the Ford Foundation decided to take social criteria
into consideration in determining its investment strategy47 and
thereafter began to extend its assistance in investments to many
organizations otherwise ineligible for its grants because of their non-
charitable status but eligible for its loans. The letter of gift that first
funded the Russell Sage Foundation permitted trustees to set aside
up to one quarter of the principal of the fund to make investments
for "social betterment"; as to this proportion, the amount of return
would be secondary."8
Reliance solely on such overt signs of investment strategy, how-
ever, necessarily underestimates the extent to which foundations
implement social policies in their decisions about investment. Aside
from a conscious, articulated strategy, other policies can have social
impact. Princeton University, though not a grant-making founda-
tion, was reported to have avoided making investments in certain
major banks that were extending credit to the Republic of South
Africa.49 Other foundations have avoided investments in the tobacco
industry or in certain defense-related industries." Whereas avoid-
ance of investments might not rise to the level of a strategy, it
certainly demonstrates the degree of influence that foundations can
exert in making decisions about investments. These are all decisions
made by the governing structures of private foundations without
any requirement of external input as to how these decisions should
be made, as long as the managers merely act prudently and satisfy
the broad guidelines of the trust instrument.
'7 See W. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 95 (1972).
" See R. NELSON, supra note 27, at 89.
19 See Simon, Foundations as Stockholders; Corporate Responsibility, in NEw YORK UNI-
VERSITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 39, 44
(H. Sellin ed. 1971). Regardless of one's position on this particular investment policy, it could
be admired for the simple fact that it was the outgrowth of a more democratic process than
what typically characterizes grant-making foundations. The Princeton trustees responded to
the demands of a specific constituency: the university students. Those with an affinity for
certain democratic, or perhaps populist, ideals, which require that the managers of our
resources be responsible to some public body, find a greater degree of legitimacy in a decision-
making process through which the managers are compelled to react to the preferences of a
specified community to whose benefit they are dedicated to serve-whether students, specific
donees, or geographic segments of the population.
" See B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 40, at 56.
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C. Influences as Shareholder
Foundations have traditionally maintained a higher proportion of
their assets in corporate stock than have most other institutional
investors."' This fact, in conjunction with the size of their holdings
in assets, provides significant private foundations with a degree of
influence upon many of the corporations in their portfolio. Unlike
influence arising from discretion as to investment, a "nonuse" of the
foundation's influence on the internal policies of portfolio corpora-
tions cannot occur. Both voting and not voting the shares consti-
tutes an exercise of influence. A foundation's refusal to vote its
portfolio stock might work to deny a corporation a quorum on any
issue and prevent the management from effecting a specific funda-
mental change. Thus the mere act of voting, regardless of voting
stance, provides corporate management an essential first step in the
exercise of its power" and gives the foundation some influence.
Beyond merely greasing the mechanism of corporate decision-
making, the vote of private foundations has tended to lean heavily
in favor of management.13 This practice need not necessarily reflect
consideration of the issues involved. The SEC's seminal Institu-
tional Investor Study54 revealed that fifty percent of the institutions
surveyed had a policy of automatically voting for management. 5
Management can rely on this voting block to provide a degree of
certainty in obtaining any of its objectives regardless of the issue
involved. Further, the SEC found that when financial institutions
lose confidence in any particular portfolio corporation's manage-
ment they sell their position rather than attempt to influence corpo-
rate decisions. This fact further skews the outcome of any vote in
favor of management because institutional holdings in a specific
corporation represent either a short term "yes" vote for manage-
ment or, at worst, a long range "maybe" vote by a new shareholder
11 See R. NELSON, supra note 27, at 7, chart 1. See generally SEC, INSTnTONAL INVESTOR
STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY]. In 1969 the foundations sampled by the SEC had 78.42% of their
assets invested in common stock and warrants. 3 id. at 1257. This contrasts with the
17.3% of assets invested in common stock by financial institutions in general in 1968. 1 id. at
102.
1, See 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 51, at 2749.
See R. NELSON, supra note 27, at 114.
"' INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 51.
m 5 id. at 2750-51.
m Id. at 2846. The SEC was referring to institutional investors in general, but no reason
exists to believe that foundations behave differently.
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for management if the institution questions management's compe-
tence and chooses to sell. Of course, those foundations with substan-
tial holdings in any corporation would be unable to dispose of their
holdings except over an extended period of time. In these situations,
the corporation's management could anticipate a safe block of af-
firmative votes in the long as well as the short run .5 As a result, the
issue becomes not so much whether foundations customarily sup-
port the management of a company in their portfolio (although the
predictability of that support increases the collective influence of
foundations) but rather that foundations, by their very ownership
of equity securities, possess a broad influence on corporate policy.
This influence is attributable to the foundations' discretion in vot-
ing their portfolio securities and would be felt regardless of the
direction of any particular vote."
Some might argue that this influence is lessened by certain legal
5' Examples of foundations that could be considered solidly "locked in" to positions with
particular companies in their portfolio include: the Sloan Foundation, with more than
$89,000,000 of GM common stock in a total portfolio of $297,000,000 of marketable securities,
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Report for 1976, at 62-63 (1976) (copy on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association); the Lilly Endowment, Inc., which has $635,600,000 of Eli Lilly &
Co. common stock in a total portfolio of $671,100,000 in investments, Lilly Endowment, Inc.,
Report for 1976, at 88 (1976) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association); the
Mott Foundation, $145,500,000 of whose $356,000,000 of assets are tied up in GM common
stock, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Annual Report for 1975, at 30 (1975) (copy on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association). Even the relatively well diversified Mellon Foun-
dation has more than 19% of its $219,000,000 of investments in the form of Gulf Oil stock,
Richard King Mellon Foundation, 1976 Annual Report 44, 45 (1976) (copy on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
One of the best documented instances of foundations exerting their influence to support
management in a shareholders' dispute occurred when the Project on Corporate Responsibil-
ity organized the Campaign to Make General Motors Responsible in 1970 and 1971. For an
account of the issues involved in this proxy fight, see B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, supra
note 40; Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69
MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971). As events developed, the votes held by private foundations, even
had they been voted against management, would not have altered the outcome of the proxy
contest. Nevertheless, four of the largest foundations holding GM stock and assuming a
promanagement stance-the Charles F. Kettering, Richard King Mellon, Charles Stewart
Mott, and Alfred P. Sloan Foundations-were created by officers or directors of GM. See id.
at 506 n.435. These four foundations together controlled more than two percent of all the votes
cast in the proxy contest. In a corporation as widely held as GM, the vote of such a concen-
trated holding would be influential regardless of the outcome of the contest.
" The law of trusts makes no demands as to which side a trustee must support. No reason
exists why securities held by foundations need be voted for one particular position or another.
A trustee of a foundation, like any other trustee, can vote the trust portfolio in any manner
that promotes the interests of the beneficiaries. 3 A. Scorr, supra note 45, § 193.1. The law
imposes no requirement that trustees assume that a corporation's management will have
any sort of monopoly on the answer to the question of what will best benefit the share-
holders.
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limitations on ownership of stock by private foundations. As pre-
viously mentioned," some of the provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 relating to private foundations were enacted with an eye
toward limiting the influence foundations can exert through their
portfolio holdings. Ample reason can be found, however, to question
the effectiveness of these restrictions. Generally, a foundation is
permitted to own up to twenty percent of the voting stock of any
single corporation without suffering a penalty tax." This figure is
reduced by the percentage of such stock owned by any person with
certain significant relations to the foundation, defined as a
"disqualified person."'" This portion of the Tax Reform Act of 1969
was intended to inhibit a then-increasing tendency to use private
foundations as a means of perpetuating control over business enti-
ties.1
2
Even assuming that this general restriction would be an effective
means of prohibiting control of corporations by foundations if
strictly followed, it has been so diluted and qualified by myriad
exceptions that it seldom will accomplish its intended objectives. To
begin with, the twenty percent limit on a foundation's holdings in
any corporation may be increased to thirty-five percent if the Trea-
sury Department is satisfied that the corporation is controlled by
one or more third parties unrelated to the foundation or any dis-
qualified persons.6 3 Thus foundations are permitted to own thirty-
five percent of the shares in corporations controlled by unrelated
third parties, and even if that does not amount to absolute control,
it remains significant influence.
Moreover, the Tax Reform Act provides that if a foundation in
existence on May 26, 1969, on that date owned, alone or with dis-
qualified persons, more than twenty percent of any corporation, it
need not reduce its holdings below the lesser of either the amount
" See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
" I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
11 Disqualified persons include: substantial contributors to the foundation; foundation
managers, which would include both trustees, officers, and certain employees of authority;
any individual who owns more than 20% of a contributor to the foundation; certain relatives,
including spouses, ancestors and lineal descendants, and spouses of lineal descendants; a
business entity in which any one of the above individuals owns or holds a 35% interest; a
private foundation controlled by the private foundation in question or receiving substantially
all its contributions from the person or persons making contributions to the private founda-
tion in question; or government officials. Id. § 4946(a).
" See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 27-31, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. Naws 2066, 2066-72.
" I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2)(B).
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it so held or fifty percent of the voting stock for any one corporation
to avoid a penalty tax.64 Consequently, any foundation that owned
between twenty and fifty percent of the voting stock in any corpora-
tion as of May 1969 may continue to maintain those holdings indefi-
nitely without incurring a penalty tax. Finally, should a foundation
receive a new gift or bequest after 1969 that brings its total holdings
in any corporation to more than twenty percent, it may take as long
as five years to bring its holdings down to twenty percent without
suffering a penalty tax.65
Even positing an absolute twenty percent rule, serious doubt
would remain as to whether owning twenty percent (or even less in
a widely held corporation) would not constitute such significant
influence as to be the functional equivalent of absolute control.
When Representative Wright Patman spoke at the hearings before
the House Committee on Ways and Means in support of the tax
reform measures that ultimately evolved into the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, he urged that the maximum ownership of a foundation in
any corporation be set at three percent, not the twenty percent
eventually adopted.6 Representative Patman, in proposing this fig-
ure, was not alone in believing that far less than twenty percent of
a corporation's stock could give control. Although originally suggest-
ing twenty percent as the cutoff figure, the Treasury Department
asserted that as little as "2, 3 or 4 percent of the voting shares" of
some large, publicly held corporations could constitute control."7
The SEC, in a slightly more conservative posture, thought owner-
ship of ten percent of the outstanding stock would be sufficient to
effect control or at least to influence significantly corporate deci-
sionmaking.6 5 Regardless of which figure is the most accurate, far
less than twenty percent ownership in a corporation can, in some
instances, provide a shareholder with control. In many more in-
" Id. § 4943(c)(4). Should private foundations own more than 50% in any one corporation,
they would then have 20, 15, or 10 years to reduce those holdings, depending upon the size of
the holdings. Id. § 4943(c)(4)(B).
0 Id. § 4943(c)(6).
" See Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means (pt. 1),
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969) (statement of Rep. Patman).
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 36 n.22.
" See 5 INSTITUIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 51, at 2550. In one celebrated instance,
In re Caplan's Petition, 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, affl'd, 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d
908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964), ownership of three percent of the stock in a publicly held
corporation was adequate to allow Roy Cohn to determine who would fill 7 of the 10 director-
ships on the company's board.
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stances such an interest constitutes a significant influence on corpo-
rate boards.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was not designed to restrict the
influence of foundations on corporate decisions other than control
situations. Nevertheless, not only did the Act consciously fail to
address the issue of influence in noncontrol situations, but it also is
quite ineffective in those contexts in which it did intend to restrict
the influence of foundations.
D. Interrelations with Portfolio Companies
The sway that significant private foundations can exert on the
policy of corporations in their portfolios is augmented by the inter-
locking of trustees of foundations and the boards of portfolio corpo-
rations. Without regard to the dominance of either party, director-
trustee interlocking provides a means of intimate communication
between a corporate board and a major shareholder. In conjunction
with actual voting influence, this type of influence gives foundations
direct input into corporate decisions, or alternatively it provides
corporate management a voice within a body that must determine
how to vote its shares in that corporation.
Although a realistic measurement of the effect of interlocking
would be difficult, the SEC's study concluded that such relation-
ships must increase the opportunity that already exists for founda-
tions to exert influence as corporate shareholders. 9 Of the founda-
tions surveyed by the SEC, none had a policy forbidding trustees
from holding a similar position on the board of portfolio compa-
nies. 70 The phenomenon of interlocking is widespread among the
significant private foundations. In fact, of the twenty largest foun-
dations listed by size of assets, eighteen have one or more trustees
also sitting as a director on the board of a portfolio corporation, and
one foundation (Pew Memorial Fund) does not list individual trust-
ees, leaving only one foundation with no interrelationships. 7
III. SPECIAL TAX TREATMENT
Part of the illogic of significant private foundations being in a
See 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 51, at 2716.
7' Id. at 2731, tab. IV-26.
n Sources for this study included FOUNDATION CENTER, supra note 6; STANDARD & POOR'S
RE ISTER OF CORPORATIONS, DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES (1977); WHO's WHO IN AMERICA (1976);
and either the 1976 annual report of the foundation involved or its 1976 IRS Form 990-PF or
Form 990-AR.
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position to exert, without public input, the influence attendant to
their investments and grants is that foundations possess some of
their vast wealth by virtue of public subsidization. The public gives
up tax revenues both in allowing a charitable deduction for the
foundation's donors72 and in exempting the private foundation itself
from income taxation.73 In a very real sense, at least half of the
wealth now possessed by private foundations represents a sacrifice
by the general public, through deductions and exemptions, of other-
wise collectable federal tax funds.74
One could argue that a reason for exempting private foundations
from the payment of federal income tax is the difficulty in determin-
ing what really constitutes taxable income to a charitable institu-
tion. 75 Regardless of the legitimacy of this difficulty, the fact re-
,2 See note 81 infra.
11 I.R.C. § 501(a) applies the exemption to certain "exempt organizations," defined in
§ 501(c) to include "foundation[s], organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." Id. § 501(c)(3).
The exemption has numerous qualifications. Foundations lose their exemption if they devote
a "substantial" part of their activities to political activities. Id. Taxes also may be imposed
upon the unrelated business income of exempt foundations. Id. § 511. Further, the 1969 Tax
Reform Act imposes a number of penalty taxes on private foundations for: defined acts of
self-dealing, id. § 4941; failure to pay out annually a specified percentage of asset value
(presently, at least five percent), id. § 4942(e); maintaining ownership greater than 20% in
portfolio companies, id. § 4943, see text accompanying notes 63-64 supra; purchasing risky
investments, I.R.C. § 4944; and making certain disfavored expenditures such as expenditures
for carrying on propaganda, influencing public elections, or making grants to organizations
without responsibility for expenditures, id. § 4945. These qualifications apply largely to
unusual situations; the basic rule grants an exemption to foundations that comply with the
general requirements for exempt status.
11 This is an estimate devised by Professor Karst based on the assumption of the average
tax bracket of people who donate to private foundations. See Karst, The Tax Exemption of
Donor-Controlled Foundations, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 183, 187 (1964). Were one to consider the
benefit to foundations derived from their exemptions from various state taxes as well, this
figure might seem conservative.
11 Professors Bittker and Rahdert argued that were the exemption removed, computing the
"net income" of exempt organizations "would be a conceptually difficult, if not a self-
contradictory task." Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 307 (1976). Initially, they argued, we would be
confronted with the question of whether gifts and bequests would be excluded from income.
Id. at 308-09. This question is not of great concern to foundations because after their forma-
tive years they operate largely out of interest on endowments. The authors also were con-
cerned with what could be justified as legitimate business deductions because neither the
expenses of a foundation nor its actual grants can be characterized as expenses incurred to
generate profits. Id. at 309-13. In the past, these questions have been mooted by the fact that
an exemption has and does exist, see text accompanying note 94 infra, and no need has arisen
to calculate the taxable income of foundations.
The answers to these questions are of some relevance, however, if the tax exemption is part
of the subsidization provided to foundations. Suffice it to say that the questions posed are
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mains that foundations at present are not responsible for paying any
income taxes on their earnings, unlike a business entity, trust, or
private individual. In 1973, the staff of the Senate Subcommittee
on Foundations estimated that foundations annually avoid paying
over $600,000,000 in taxes.76 Because this exemption allows founda-
tions to retain funds that they otherwise would have to pay into the
public treasury, it is essentially a means of disbursing federal funds
to foundations.
This fact is not diminished by the excise tax of four percent pri-
vate foundations have paid on their net income from investments
since 1970.11 This tax is not intended as a tax on income per se but
rather as a means of compensating the government for services pro-
vided to foundations and offsetting the costs of audits by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. 8 Although this tax may exceed what is neces-
not insolvable. Unless one were willing to say that foundations do not earn any taxable income
by the very nature of their function (which perhaps begs the issue of the impact of the
exemption), then the exemption does have some meaning and does provide a benefit. No
reason exists to believe that, as with individuals, trusts, and corporations, tax principles could
not be devised to provide meaningful measurements of taxable income of charities were the
tax exemptions not available. With the development of these principles one could measure
the full impact of the exemption. Until then, one can only say that the exemption provides
some degree of federal subsidy, and one can only make gross estimates of the amount of that
subsidy.
1, Senator Vance Hartke referred to a $610,000,000 tax exemption for 1972 in the hearings
before his subcommittee in 1973. See Hearings on the Role of Private Foundations in Today's
Society and a Review of the Impact of Charitable Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969
on the Support and Operation of Private Foundations Before the Subcomm. on Foundations
of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1973) (statement of Sen. Hartke).
1 I.R.C. § 4940(a). The "net investment income" is equal to the foundation's interest,
dividends, rents, and royalties (except that proportion taxable as unrelated business income
under id. § 511) plus capital gains and less ordinary or necessary expenses paid or incurred
in managing the income-producing assets. Id. § 4940(c).
11 The House version of the 1969 Tax Reform Act spoke of the tax on investment income
as a device for ensuring that the costs of the "benefits of government" would be "borne, at
lMast to some extent, by all of those able to pay." The tax was viewed as a "user fee" to
compensate the government for its "vigorous and extensive administration." The House fixed
its tax at 7.5% of income. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 119691
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1648. The Senate, on the other hand, called the tax an
"audit fee tax," stating that it was not in any way withdrawing the income tax exemption
and making clear that the tax was solely a "user charge" to pay for the supervision of private
foundations. It set the tax at .2% of the assets. S. REp. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 27,
reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2027, 2032. The conference report sup-
ported neither the House nor the Senate but labelled the tax an "excise tax" and set the tax
at 4% of income. CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 278, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2392, 2392. Professors Bittker and Rahdert pointed out that, assuming
annual income of private foundations to be roughly 5% of assets, the 4% excise tax closely
approximates the Senate's proposal. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 75, at 326 n.68. The
regulations also refer to the tax as an "excise tax" and not an "income tax." See, e.g., Treas.
Reg. § 53.4940-1(a) (1977).
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sary to offset the costs of audits,79 in view of the negligible amount
of revenue it raises"0 it certainly is not a serious inroad on the tax-
exempt status of foundations. For all practical purposes, the tax
exemption for private foundations remains intact.
Of greater significance to private foundations than their exemp-
tion, but intimately linked to it, are the various charitable deduc-
tions available to donors. In terms of both the ultimate monetary
benefit to foundations and the total tax revenue lost by the federal
government, the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code granting
charitable deductions are far more important than the provisions
granting exemptions. An individual taxpayer is allowed a deduction
from his gross income for contributions to tax-exempt foundations.',
Interestingly, the Code treats nonoperating, private foundations dif-
ferently from both operating foundations and publicly supported
foundations. Deductions are allowed for contributions to nonoperat-
ing, private foundations only to the extent of twenty percent of the
taxpayer's contribution base for the year, whereas the deductible
figure is fifty percent when the recipient is an operating or publicly
supported foundation or private foundation that distributes all con-
tributions received within a year of receipt.12 The difference in treat-
ment of nonoperating foundations reflects a desire to give greater
7' See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 75, at 326; Wadsworth, Private Foundations and the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 255, 259 (1975); Worthy, The Tax Reform
Act of 1969: Consequences For Private Foundations, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 232, 247
(1975).
1 This tax raised only a little more than $76,600,000 in fiscal year 1974. See Worthy, supra
note 79, at 247.
11 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (granting the deduction for charitable contributions). The Code de-
fines a charitable contribution as a gift to or for the use of
[a] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation:
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under
the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of
the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary,
or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competi-
tion (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason
of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of any candidate for public office.
Id. § 170(c)(2).




encouragement to organizations that immediately spend their reve-
nues for the activities they support and are not mere intermediaries
that later will distribute donations to "operating" charities." Fram-
ing the distinction in terms of percentage of contribution base also
favors the foundation that is, by necessity, more responsive to pub-
lic pressures and priorities because it must rely on continuous giving
rather than on contributions by a donor.84
Each of these charitable deductions constitutes a federal subsidy
to foundations. In each instance, the government does not collect
federal taxes on assets going to or for the use of private foundations.
Donors are thus giving to foundations what they otherwise would
have to surrender to the federal treasury. The charitable deduction
traditionally has been justified on the ground that charitable contri-
butions do not represent consumable income. 5 Many challenge this
view and regard charitable giving as another form of consumption
with the donor purchasing either status, a feeling of having done a
charitable deed, or perpetuation of his own values. Therefore, they
argue, it should be subject to taxation just like any other outlay of
income.8
The budget of the United States government recognizes that the
concept underlying charitable tax deductions and tax exemptions
for foundations represents a form of government funding of these
institutions. Since 1976, the budget has included a "tax expendi-
ture" analysis designed to account for losses in federal revenue at-
tributable to deductions and exemptions intended to achieve cer-
tain social and economic ends.87 Of course, defining a tax provision
as an "expenditure" requires the determination of a "normal" tax
structure from which the particular provision is regarded as a devia-
tion." Inasmuch as deductions for charitable contributions are con-
See H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1963).
, Besides a deduction from the donor's income tax, the Code provides a similar deduction
in computing the donor's gift and estate taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522. With gift and estate
taxes, however, the Code has no limiting differential between nonoperating, private founda-
tions and other types of foundations.
11 See Wallace & Fisher, The Charitable Deduction Under Section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code, in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 4, at 2131, 2132.
' See FILER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 107. See also McDaniel, Study of Federal
Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions, in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 4, at 2417,
2500-03.
x1 This tax expenditure section in the budget is required as of 1976 by § 601 of the Congres-
sional Budget Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. § 11(e) (1976).
- Although such a normal tax structure is nowhere defined in the Internal Revenue Code,
certain features, such as progressive tax rates for individuals, threshold levels for tax liability,
personal exemptions, deduction of business expenses, exclusion of unrealized capital gains
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sidered deviations from this norm, they necessarily are tax expendi-
tures."9 The government has estimated that the tax expenditure
attributable to the deductions for charitable contributions will be
$6,000,000,000 in 1978.90 This does not readily reveal what the fed-
eral tax expenditure might be for private foundations alone because
the figure includes tax expenditures for all deductions for charitable
contributions except those made to educational institutions. More-
over, it does not include a separate accounting in terms of tax ex-
penditure for the exemption afforded foundations.9 The figure does
indicate, however, that the expenditure can be estimated and that
the Treasury Department considers providing the deduction as
equivalent to providing federal funding.
Admittedly, determining the "standard" tax involves normative
judgments.9 2 That does not alter the basic premise of the notion of
the tax expenditure, which is that certain tax policies result in the
flow of federal funds to certain activities just as if federal funds were
and losses, and treatment of individuals and corporations as separate tax-paying entities are
considered part of the normal tax structure.
See generally OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1978, at 119-42 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL
ANALYSES]; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT, FISCAL YEAR 1978, at 34-38 (1978).
" SPECIAL ANALYSES, supra note 89, at 130, tab. F-2.
The special analysis of the budget does not indicate why the figure representing tax
expenditure for charities does not include the tax exemption afforded qualifying charities.
The analysis of tax expenditures in the budget, however, is not intended to be all-inclusive.
The government has acknowledged that some items are not contained because they have not
been fully studied or because insufficient information exists upon which to base an estimate
Id. at 124. Because no determination has been made as to what would constitute taxable
income for an otherwise exempt charity, see note 75 supra, measurement of the benefit of the
exemption in terms of a tax expenditure would be hard. Many commentators have recognized
that the exemption in essence serves as a subsidy. See, e.g., Reiling, Federal Taxation: What
is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525, 595 (1958).
92 Some tax scholars argue that providing an accounting for tax expenditures is difficult,
if not impossible, because of the judgmental factor involved in determining an "ideal or
correct tax structure." See Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244, 248 (1969). The federal budget, which for three years has been
able to provide a consistent accounting of tax expenditures and a rational scheme for the
inclusion and exclusion of various items, is the best response to such critics. Cf. Surrey &
Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J.
528, 533 (1969) (a large group of tax experts agree precisely on what could be considered a
working model for a tax norm). But see Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-a Reply to
Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969). Furthermore, one easily can find
convincing and respected literature arguing that the existence of a tax norm is axiomatic and
that a departure from that norm in the form of exemptions and deductions constitutes a
subsidy. See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 1-14 (1973); Surrey, Federal Income Tax
Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Govern-
mental Assistance, 84 HARv. L. REv. 352, 352-64, 381-94 (1970).
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being distributed to these activities. The debate will continue as to
whether some tax policies should be classified as the "norm" or
"special"; refinements must continue to be made. Nevertheless, for
federal budgetary purposes, charitable deductions for gifts to pri-
vate foundations, and arguably the exemption for these founda-
tions, represent the equivalent of a flow of federal funds to private
foundations.
One response to this is to attach great significance to the histori-
cal extension of exemptions to charitable organizations. Some com-
mentators have viewed the historical record as establishing accep-
tance of the proposition that taxing foundations is not necessarily a
privilege of government and that it should not be regarded as part
of the normal tax structure.13 Yet this argument suggests more than
one conclusion. A tradition of exempting foundations from income
taxation as well as permitting deductions for donations supports the
observation that whatever policies or values operate in the present
to encourage the federal subsidization of foundations also operated
at earlier times. Special tax treatment for charitable organizations
has been a component of the American tax system practically since
its inception, having antecedents in the British system of the seven-
teenth century. 4 Explanations for this special treatment have var-
ied. As to the exemption, many saw the imposition of an "income"
tax as being hard to reconcile with the activities of nonprofit organi-
zations . 5 Moreover, the extensive recordkeeping associated with the
tax, in some instances, was thought to be overly burdensome in light
of the minimal production of revenue." As to the deduction, an
individual's contributions to a charity were not considered a portion
of that individual's consumable income. 7 Also, both the exemption
and the deduction were considered means of supporting charities
without direct governmental funding. 8
" See, e.g., J. NASON, TRUSTEES AND THE FUTuRE OF FOUNDATIONS 9-11 (1977) (study under-
taken at the request of the Council on Foundations and funded by 11 foundations). Nason, a
member of several private foundations, states:
Congress has from time to time expanded or contracted the charitable deduction; but
that does not change the fact that exemption from taxation, while it may be limited
by government, is not an act of grace on the government's part, but a recognition of a
right not to be taxed except as the result of specific popular action.
Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
'" See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 75, at 301; Rabin, Charitable Trusts and Charitable
Deductions, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 912 (1966); Reiling, supra note 91, at 527.
" See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 75, at 302, 304.
See id. at 304.
' See Rabin, supra note 94, at 915.
U See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 75, at 304 n.14.
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To say that this special tax treatment amounts to a federal sub-
sidy does not deny the legitimate motivations underlying the deduc-
tion and exemption, nor does it argue for the repeal of either. Nor
does it imply that charities, particularly private foundations, are
not providing a service that otherwise would have to be provided by
government. It does mean that government is assisting private foun-
dations in providing these services and that these private founda-
tions are spending public funds as the governing boards of private
foundations see fit. The trustees who invest and disburse these
funds do so as servants of the public (the beneficiary of the founda-
tions), but the public has no part in determining the selection of its
"servants" nor in advising its "servants" how these funds can best
benefit the public.
Furthermore, the benefits provided to private foundations by the
charitable deduction might well go beyond the immediate subsidy
involved in allowing funds that otherwise would be channeled to the
treasury to flow into foundations. Studies conducted for the Filer
Commission indicated that for each $1 lost by the treasury due to
the charitable deduction, charitable organizations actually receive
between $1.15 and $1.29 in additional contributions over and above
what they would receive without the deduction.9 If the results of
these studies are correct,' 9 then private foundations benefit not
merely by the amount of the lost tax revenue but also by an addi-
tional sum surpassing the taxpayer's actual benefit in tax savings.
Thus the tax benefit to charities would exceed the subsidy that can
be identified as a tax expenditure.
IV. THE PRESENT GOVERNING STRUCTURE OF SIGNIFICANT
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
As the discussion so far has shown, significant private foundations
have enormous social and political impact. Their special treatment
by the tax laws, which in effect means they wield such influence in
part through use of public funds, accentuates their unique nature.
Given the notion of responsiveness to the public-an idea funda-
mental to our society-one might assume the public has its say in
" FILER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 129. See generally Feldstein & Clotfelter, Tax
Incentives and Charitable Contributions in the United States: A Microeconometric Analysis,
in 3 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 4, at 1393.
' Several earlier studies had indicated that the revenue foregone by the treasury actually
exceeded the benefit of the contributions to charities. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 86, at
2435-42.
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the governance of these institutions. This assumption is inaccurate,
as is shown by an examination of the process used to select the
trustees and the way in which those trustees exercise their power
once selected.
Private foundations usually take the form of either a charitable
trust, a not-for-profit corporation in which the corporate directors
are viewed as the trustees, or a trust that is instructed to form a not-
for-profit corporation.'"' The corporation is the most popular form
for structuring the private foundation. Foundations can be estab-
lished by a document such as a trust agreement between the donor
and trustee, by a will, or even by an oral statement of trust. Addi-
tionally, filing of the corporate charter and bylaws in a state may
be required in the case of the not-for-profit corporation. In practice,
little difference can be found between the powers and duties of the
directors of a not-for-profit corporation and the trustees of a charita-
ble trust.
1 2
A. Selection of Trustees
1. Homogeneity and Its Consequences
The initial members of any foundation's governing body we could
construct, whether serving as directors or actual trustees, would be
selected by the donor. The pool of potential trustees is generally
limited to persons with whom the donor has had personal contacts
and in whom he has confidence. Often the original board will be
composed of family members, close business associates, and legal or
financial advisors.' 3 The donor predictably seeks trustees with val-
ues common to his own to ensure both the advancement of his
objectives and the smooth functioning of the board. One study of
foundations with assets of $100,000,000 or more conducted for the
Twentieth Century Fund summarized its findings as to the selection
process with respect to the initial board:
[M]embers of a foundation board are normally drawn from the
business, legal, financial, and social circles of the donor and his
See generally F. ANDREWS, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS OF FOUNDATIONS (1958); F. ANDREWS,
supra note 15, at 38-62; M. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 7, at 54-111; H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT
CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND AssOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1974); A. ZURCHER, supra note 21, at
10; Note, supra note 7, at 480-81.
-' See M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 154-57.
'3 See F. ANDREWS, supria note 15, at 64-65; J. NASON, supra note 93, at 47-48; W. NIELSEN,
supra note 47, at 314-15. Foundations whose initial boards were chosen from personal rela-
tions of the founder include the Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller, and Sage Foundations. See F.
ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 65.
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family since they can be counted on to have "sound" ideas and not
to make trouble. The usual product of this selection method is a
homogeneous group consisting of aging members of the upper so-
cioeconomic class in American society.
0 4
While the homogeneity of the original board would tend to dissi-
pate over time if the successors were selected in a process indepen-
dent of the influence of the private foundation, such is not the case.
Reelection of the initial trustee is the rule for the typical foundation
unless the trustee does not desire to be reelected.105 When replace-
ments must be made, the trustees themselves generally make the
selection.' Suggestions for replacements usually come from among
the board members, with deciding weight occasionally accorded to
the preference of the retiring trustee.' 7 Because social diversity is
not of particular concern in selecting replacements, the unsurprising
result is that "a relatively homogeneous group of trustees will gener-
ally select new members at least of their own social status, if not
better."''0 A very recent examination of trustees of foundations, in
, W. NIELSEN, supra note 47, at 315.
" See F. ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 81.
Two examples of provisions in the governing documents of significant private founda-
tions demonstrate the typical manner in which the donor provides for replacement of trustees.
The indenture establishing the Duke Endowment, a foundation operating as a trust and one
of the 10 largest private foundations, provides:
Vacancies occurring among the trustees from any cause whatever (for which purpose
an increase in the number of trustees shall be deemed to cause vacancies to the extent
of such increase in number of trustees) may be filled by the remaining trustees at any
meeting of the trustees, and must be so filled within six months after the vacancy
occurs ....
Indenture Establishing Duke Foundation art. 2 (Dec. 11, 1924) (copy on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association). Similarly, the constitution of the Carnegie Corp. of New York, a
foundation operating as a not-for-profit corporation, as amended reads:
Section 2. The board of trustees shall be constituted as follows:
The number of trustees shall be seventeen. Sixteen seats shall be known as term
seats and one seat as an ex officio seat. The ex officio seat shall be occupied by the
person who is the president of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The holders of the
term seats shall be elected by the remaining trustees of the corporation to serve for
terms of four years or such lesser period as may be specified at the time of election.
The duration of terms shall be so scheduled that the number of seats to be filled shall,
so far as practicable, be equal in each succeeding year.
Section 4. Any vacancy in the board of trustees may be filled for the unexpired
term by the votes of a majority of the remaining trustees.
Carnegie Corp. of N.Y. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 4 (Nov. 10, 1911) (copy on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association). Thus provisions for replacement of trustees vary little with the form
a foundation takes.
"I7 See D. YOUNG & W. MOORE, supra note 12, at 19.
lo Id.
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commenting on the tendency of boards to select people like them-
selves as successors (much as the donor seeks to find a reflection of
his own personality in the original board), noted: "The self-
perpetuating character of most boards makes it natural for trustees
to select people of their own ilk, i.e., people of comparable standing
in the community, people who will think alike rather than creating
controversy by introducing different and possibly conflicting view-
points.'""'
Regardless of the board's performance or its policies (provided
they remain within the generally broad dictates of the founding
instruments), it will select its replacements. Failure to achieve a
board's own or anyone else's goals raises no bar to self-perpetuation.
Nor, for that matter, does anyone exist to measure the foundation's
performance. Win or lose, the board determines its successors, and
its successors will more likely than not mirror the personality of the
predecessors. Once set in motion, this governing structure continues
in an uninterrupted line of succession much as would a monarchy.
Unlike the management of a corporation or a union, or even a uni-
versity that occasionally must respond to pressures from alumni or
students, the board of a foundation is not vulnerable to having its
choices of candidates for reelection or replacement overridden.
This results in an almost incomparable degree of "sameness." "An
overwhelming majority of the trustees of the large foundations are
white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant," concluded the Peterson
Commission in 1970.110 The Commission reported after examining
twenty-five of the largest foundations that
only four of these foundations have boards whose members might
be considered broadly representative of the nation's various geo-
graphic regions. The remainder tend to represent only single regions
with the New England-Middle Atlantic regions in the clear lead.
Moreover, half of the trustees of the twenty-five largest foundations
attended Ivy League colleges, and roughly two-thirds have business,
banking, or legal backgrounds. Of the foundation trustees for whom
information was available, none had a background in organized
labor. There were very few Catholics, Jews, or Negroes, or, for that
matter, women or young trustees.''
10 J. NASON, supra note 93, at 41.
1" PErERSON COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 9, at 89-90.
" Id. at 89. One commentator reproduced the following quote verbatim from a 1936 socio-
logical examination of trustees, which he concluded "remains all too true":
[The typical trustee's] position in the community is that of a person who belongs to
the highest income-receiving class of the population; he is, presumably, "respectable"
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Regardless of how attractive or unattractive this type of personal-
ity might be, such uniformity necessarily has three consequences.
First, the trustees are limited in their ability to identify and respond
to the problems of a broad spectrum of society. Second, certain
administrative inefficiencies develop that further limit the founda-
tion's ability to deal with pressing issues. Third, conflicts of interest
arise, a factor deleterious to any organization.
As to the first phenomenon, the Filer Commission noted a need
for foundations to "broaden their boards and staffs so that a wide
range of viewpoints is reflected in each organization's very gover-
nance and management." ' 2 In fact, every major study of founda-
tions within the last ten years, although often sponsored by the
foundations themselves, has found a need to broaden the personal-
ity of the typical board of trustees so that foundations can better
perform their obligations to the public.' 3
The homogeneity of the trustees also is reflected in the types of
administrative structures they have set up to carry out their task.
Many of the significant private foundations have not developed the
kind of staff that is necessary to identify public interests and admin-
ister the foundation's funds accordingly. One study conducted in
1972 found that of the thirty-three largest foundations, "[o]nly ten
and "conventional" and belongs to the "best" clubs and churches, and he associates
with men of prestige, power and affluence. His training has been largely in the arts
and humanities and he possesses only a slight background in the sciences and technolo-
gies. He resides in the Northeastern section of the United States and has attended one
of the private colleges in that region. His "intelligence" is ranked high by various
institutions of higher learning from whom he has received signal honors. He receives
his income primarily from profits and fees. In short, he is a member of that successful
and conservative class which came into prominence during the latter part of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, the class whose status is based primarily upon
pecuniary success.
J. NASON, supra note 93, at 40 (quoting E. LiNDmsA,, WEALTH AND CULTURE 44-46 (1936)). See
W. NiELsEN, supra note 47, at 316.
",2 FILmR Comm,'N Rpoir, supra note 4, at 170-71.
HI E.g., id. at 170-72. See J. NASON, supra note 93, at 39-45; W. NIEMLsEN, supra note 47, at
313-22; PrrFsoN COMM'N REPOr, supra note 9, at 89-90; A. PITH, THE FOUNDATION IN THE
YEAR 2000 (1968) (monograph published by the Foundation Center Library and authored by
the president of the Carnegie Corp. of N.Y.); A. ZURCHER, supra note 21, at 35-37; Donee
Group, Private Philanthropy: Vital and Innovative or Passive and Irrelevant, in 1 RESEARCH
PAPERS, supra note 4, at 49, 66 (an appraisal of FIIm Comm'N REPoRT, supra note 4, by a group
of public interest personnel and charity representatives).
The Peterson Commission found that the lack of diversity in trustees restricted the founda-
tion's vision of society. "The implication of [the Peterson Commission] study is simply this:
these boards clearly lack the kind of diversity that could further enlarge their perceptions
about the raw surge of American life. . . ." P ERSON Co1M'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 90.
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have reasonably well-developed and capable staffs."'' 4 Without ade-
quate staffing, a foundation has a difficult time discerning the needs
of individual applicants, verifying the validity of those applicants'
projects, and developing priorities for committing the foundation's
resources. Introducing a degree of public participation into the
process for selecting trustees, however, might cause boards to strive
on their own to remedy any administrative inefficiencies. To the
extent that a public process of selection would instill in trustees a
sense of public accountability, those foundations presently lacking
an administrative framework that permits goals and priorities to be
established by a board and administered through the foundation's
staff might be motivated to develop one.
Another outgrowth of the co-optive nature of the selection process
is the kind of potential conflict of interest that arises when founda-
tion trustees sit on the boards of portfolio corporations." 5 Most large
foundations were originally funded with shares of the corporation in
which the donor made his wealth. Both the original board and its
successors are staffed by business associates who occupy positions
in the management of the primary corporation in the portfolio-the
donor's corporation. The boards are also staffed with descendants
of the donor, who also will have a financial interest in the donor's
corporation. Of the thirty-three largest private foundations studied
by Nielsen, only four were found not to have significant donor-
family or corporate ties."' Another study of conflicts of interest in
foundations indicated that of the ten largest foundations, six have
more than half their money invested in one company, and each of
those foundations constitutes those six companies' largest single
shareholder.11 7 This intertwining of the foundation's and the corpo-
ration's personnel can lead trustees of the foundation to ignore the
foundation's interest to preserve the tie between the donor's corpo-
ration and the donor's foundation.
,M W. NELSEN, supra note 47, at 323. See A. ZuRcHER, supra note 21, at 47-48 (citing a 1972
study of 662 foundations conducted by the author, which found that "32 foundations with
assets between 25 and 100 million dollars, six foundations with assets between 100 million
and 300 million dollars, and one foundation with assets between 300 million and 1 billion
dollars" had no paid staff). Cf. PETERSON COM'N REPoRT, supra note 9, at 249, tab. A. 38
(using a different sample base than Zurcher with somewhat different results though with the
same implication).
,' See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
, See W. NIELSEN, supra note 47, at 280.
,, See C. WELLEs, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: NON-PROFIT INSTrrUTIONS 63 (1977).
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The most flagrant example of trustees favoring their own interests
over those of the foundation is, of course, the failure of one-stock
foundations to diversify. It is no coincidence that at virtually every
foundation that keeps most of its assets in the shares of a single
company, the board of trustees is closely linked to the company.
Willingness to permit such a concentration of assets runs directly
counter to long-accepted standards of prudent investment manage-
ment.11
The model that has been adopted for most significant private
foundations as a process for selecting their governing members is
inadequate not merely from an external viewpoint (which demon-
strates that those for whom the foundations exist have no control
over those who direct these foundations) but also from an internal
focus (which shows that the co-optive process of selection is delete-
rious to the creative functioning of foundations).
2. Chances for Heterogeneity in the Present System
The almost complete homogeneity of boards of foundations is a
predictable outcome of a process marked by self-selecting trustees.
While a problem in itself for its obviously deleterious effects on the
vitality of foundations,"' it is equally a telltale indicator of the total
absence of input by the public in the selection of trustees. One
immediate response to arguments suggesting broadening represen-
tativeness of trustees is that even if homogeneity among boards
leads to limitations in the outlook of foundations, diversity can be
achieved without mandatory public input. The Filer Commission
took this position in strongly urging that any diversity be created
internally rather than be imposed externally.12
This position has a number of weaknesses, the most significant
of which is the apparent lack of initiative among foundations to
move toward diversification. In addition, unless the selection model
is altered, any internally created diversity will in itself be a co-opted
diversity. Governance by self-selecting trustees almost by definition
"' Id. at 69.
See-notes 112-18 supra and accompanying text.
' FLER COm'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 171. The Commission seemed to regard exact
representativeness as the only means by which public input can be bad in the process of
selecting trustees. It disregarded intermediate means of achieving some expression of public
choice that do not involve perfect representation. It thus rejected any public control of the
selection process. Other ways can be thought of, however, to bring the public, or representa-
tives of the public, into the selection process without requiring a duplication of our present
governmental structure. See pp. 821-32 infra.
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leads to a certain degree of isolation of governing boards from the
external interests of society in spite of any self-created diversity.
Henry Ford, II, the last family member to sit on the board of trust-
ees of the Ford Foundation, resigned in early 1977 after serving for
thirty-three years as a trustee. Referring to his fellow trustees, who
are considered to make up one of the more diverse governing
boards,'2' he stated that he had sensed among them a trend toward
closing themselves off from "outside influences." He admonished
the trustees: "All wisdom does not repose at [Ford Foundation
headquarters] . . . .We have a lot to learn from many sources. We
shouldn't tolerate a fortress mentality.' '2 2 The question remains
whether a "fortress mentality" ever can be avoided within a self-
perpetuating governing body.
In one respect, to speak of the homogeneity of boards is a bogus
concern. While this lack of diversity is indicative of the lack of
public input in the process of selecting trustees, the inverse of that
proposition would not hold. Heterogeneity on foundation boards, as
the boards are now structured, would not be indicative of public
participation in the selection of the trustees. Even though women
and minority groups might be beginning to have a presence on the
boards of significant private foundations,' 21 it is because foundations
are choosing their own "diverse" successors, not because the public
has been brought in on this decision. The nineteen percent of board
members who are women no more represent the public's choices for
trustees of foundations than do the eighty-one percent who are
men.'These female trustees, like their male counterparts, were
chosen by a co-optive process totally internal to the foundation.
While such diversification must be considered a movement in the
right direction, as long as the model for the governing structure of
121 See note 123 infra.
'2 N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § B, at 6, col. 6.
' Some indications have appeared that diversity among trustees of foundations is begin-
ning to increase. Nason reports that "a slowly increasing number of foundations, including
some of the middle-sized family foundations and particularly some of the leaders like Ford,
Rockefeller, and Carnegie, have made conscious efforts to broaden and diversify their board
membership by adding women, blacks and individuals chosen from non-power segments of
society." J. NAsoN, supra note 93, at 41. The FoUNDAT7oN NEws reported results of a survey
taken in 1976 indicating that women now comprise 19% of trustees of foundations. Oliver,
Women in Foundations Are Challenging the Status Quo, FOUNDATION NEws, July-Aug. 1976,
at 28, 30. A study conducted by the Association of Black Foundation Executives, Inc., based
on limited returns of its survey, found the ratio of blacks on foundation boards with
$25,000,000 to $100,000,000 in assets to be 1 in 24. Hearn, Foundation Trustees: The Need
For Diversity, FOUNDATION Naws, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 11, 12.
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foundations utilizes co-option as its mode of succession, diversity
in itself cannot reflect public influence on choice of trustees. Al-
though these matters cannot be measured, one would suspect, based
solely on the process of selection, that any diversity of appearance
on present boards does not extend to spirit or outlook.
Even if a self-selection process could guarantee that the boards
of large foundations would display true diversity in composition, a
disturbing reality would remain. The public, which is to be benefit-
ed by these foundations and by the diversity created on their
boards, would have no input in selecting those who constitute the
boards and who determine what will benefit the public and how the
benefits shall be administered.
B. Exercise of Power by Trustees
An examination of the exercise of power by trustees once they are
selected reveals two disturbing facts. First, the board usually has
nearly unfettered discretion as to the policies of the foundation.
Second, despite this power, some boards have abdicated their deci-
sionmaking to the foundation's staff, a fact that makes reform in
terms of public input even more difficult. The authority of the board
of trustees typically extends broadly to cover the essential policy
and operational issues that comprise areas of fiscal investment and
distribution of grants.124 Because the purposes of the foundation's
existence often are left open by indefinite references to "scientific,
educational and charitable purposes,' '2 the powers of the trustees
also include the authority to determine the scope and nature of the
foundation's operations.
Foundations are not self-contained institutions that will follow a
predetermined course of investment and grant-distribution. To the
contrary, most foundations can follow many divergent paths on any
number of issues, and the consequences each path holds for the
124 For example, the bylaws of the Ford Foundation dictate that "all corporate powers shall
be exercised by and under the authority of the board of directors." Ford Foundation Bylaws
art. 2, § 2 (April 1975) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). The Carnegie
Corporation's constitution indicates that the "property of this corporation shall be held, and
its affairs shall be managed and controlled, by a board of trustees not to exceed seventeen in
number." Carnegie Corp. of N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 1 (Dec. 16, 1976) (copy on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
I" See note 19 supra. With some foundations, the role of the trustee is more limited because
the foundation's purpose is more closely defined. An example is the Longwood Foundation,
established in 1937, the primary purpose of which is to support and operate a horticultural
garden in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania. See W. NisLSEN, supra note 47, at 141.
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society being served by the foundation differ vastly. In spite of this,
the trustees alone decide which path to follow. A few illustrations
of major changes in the policies of a foundation brought about inter-
nally by specific boards show the importance of this aspect of pres-
ent governing structures:
Example 1: In 1977 the trustees of the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund decided to give away almost half of the foundation's
$209,000,000 in assets to twenty-five causes and institutions sup-
ported by the Rockefeller brothers. The program represented a
major policy change, as grants previously had been awarded mostly
from earned income. The change was adopted in recognition of a
desire of the surviving Rockefeller brothers to provide for their spe-
cial causes before control of the fund, which was established in 1940,
passed on to their children.' 8 As with all major private foundations,
the public for whose benefit this foundation was established did not
play a role in selecting the trustees who made this decision.
Example 2: The Ford Foundation, determining that a higher
return could be had in equities than in the more secure bonds of
which it had significant holdings, reduced its holdings in bonds from
35% of its portfolio in 1967 to 11% in 1972, leaving itself highly
vulnerable to large portfolio losses in the bear stock market of 1973-
1974. As a consequence of this investment policy, in conjunction
with inflation and a policy of overspending, the foundation today
has less than half the purchasing power it had ten years earlier.'1
Example 3: As a whole, foundations in the decade of 1957 to
1967 made a substantial shift in some broad areas of giving. The
proportion of funds in that period going to international activities
increased from 8% of total giving to 21%. Giving to the humanities
rose from 4% to 18%.1' s While these aggregate figures represent giv-
ing by all foundations, it is safe to conclude that most, if not all, of
the grant-making decisions involved in determining these priorities
were not made by the public or by publicly selected individuals.
None of these examples should be regarded as surprising because
they merely confirm the obvious: the trustees of foundations yearly
must make crucial decisions that determine how millions, if not
billions, of dollars will be spent to benefit the public. They also
2' See N.Y. Times, June 23, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 1.
'1 See Weymouth, supra note 31, at 22, col. 1, 84, col. 1-2, 86, col. 1.
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make decisions as to how foundations' funds are to be invested.
These issues are not self-resolving. They directly affect and are in-
tended to benefit the public, yet the public does not partake in their
resolution.
The problem is exacerbated when the board defers to one particu-
lar board member or abdicates its responsibility to the foundation's
staff. Studies have found organizational breakdowns in the lack of
influence of some boards on the foundation's policy. The Peterson
Commission observed that, depending on how the foundations char-
acterized their own operations, "in nearly two-fifths of the founda-
tions, board members play so small a role in foundation grant-
making as to border on the invisible. A donor or another single
individual dominates many of these foundations."'' 9 Commentators
have alleged that some boards are controlled by their staffs.' 3 In
those situations, the trustees selected to determine and serve the
public interest are not in a position to fulfill their responsibilities.
Lack of guidance by boards creates difficulties in terms of reform-
ing the present system. The board's nonexercise of its authority
would work to short circuit the impact of any public involvement
in the selection process and should be examined further in selecting
a means to effect public input in the governance of foundations. If
public input in the governing of foundations is to exist, it can be
employed most effectively at the level of selecting the trustees be-
cause the trustees are the ones who make the important decisions
for the foundation. Once trustees become accountable to the public
they could be expected to reassert their proper authority over policy.
V. WHY THE NEED FOR PUBLIC SELECTION OF TRUSTEES?
What does the portrait painted thus far show? To summarize
briefly, the discussion so far has demonstrated that: (1) private
foundations are nonoperating, grant-making, not-for-profit organi-
zations, the funds of which are intended to serve the public welfare,
(2) private foundations wield substantial influence through their
investments and grants, (3) their financial clout is enhanced by
special tax treatment that arguably could be characterized as a
federal subsidy, (4) the typical board of trustees is a self-
perpetuating entity, responsible to no external electorate in deter-
'" PETMRaON COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 88.
3' See, e.g., J. NAsON, supra note 93, at 69. Some foundations have the additional problem




mining how the foundation's power is to be exercised, and (5) this
co-optive selection process has led to a remarkable degree of homo-
geneity among trustees and to a great incidence of potential con-
flicts of interest.
Do these factors necessarily mean that some form of mandatory
public input should be an essential element in the selection of the
trustees of these foundations? Some, upon hearing a proposal of
public control, might dismiss the proponent as a "doctrinaire popu-
list."'' 1 Still, one hopes the following discussion will find a more
receptive audience, open to both the suggestion that the governing
system of private foundations is at variance with some of the most
rudimentary principles of our society and the possibility that viable
alternative systems of governance are available that do not conflict
with these principles.
A. Public Control of Institutions with Power to Order Society's
Priorities
The same concerns that have motivated students of corporate law
to urge a greater degree of public control of corporations must have
a similar impact on those who analyze foundations. The same lack
of accountability that exists at the upper echelons of corporate man-
agement exists within the governing structure of foundations to an
even greater degree because trustees of foundations are not, even in
theory, responsible to an electorate composed of shareholders.
Ralph Nader's characterizations of the corporate board, in his re-
cently coauthored work calling for federal chartering of corpora-
tions, can be readily adapted and applied to foundations:
The modem corporation [foundation] is akin to a political state in
which all powers are held by a single clique. The senior executives
[trustees] of a large firm [foundation] are essentially not account-
able to any other officials within the firm [or to those whom the
entity is to serve-the beneficiaries].'
Just as the accountability of corporations is a problem because of
their substantial influence on society, so too must the lack of public
control of foundations be a concern. Whether in terms of sheer
amount of dollars or ultimate impact on society, significant private
foundations wield sufficient influence to call for some form of direct
societal control of their governance.
I J. NASoN, supra note 93, at 35.112R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SEuGMAN, TAun G Tix GiANT CORPORATION 118 (1976).
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Although neither the individual assets of significant private foun-
dations nor their yearly expenditures rival the assets and expendi-
tures of the largest American corporations, foundations exert as
much influence in their arena as do corporations in their arena.
Foundations are not involved in the manufacturing of goods; they
deal with the production of ideas, scientific research, learning,
health needs, and the arts. Foundations have no operative structure
to maintain and are relatively free to allocate their resources as they
deem fit. The impact of corporate expenditures will be seen in qual-
ity of products, working conditions, or environmental well-being.
Each corporate activity constitutes an ordering of priorities that
becomes an ordering of society's priorities; the same is true of large
foundations with a pervasive impact on society. This ability of cor-
porations to order society's priorities has led people such as Ralph
Nader,1 3 Christopher Stone,13 Abram Chayes,1  and others to sug-
gest the development of procedures that allow society to have
greater control over corporate governance.
The difference in arenas does not lessen the ability of foundations
to order society's priorities. The foundations' impact is felt in the
decision to sponsor the development of a specific educational ap-
proach, a medium of entertainment, or an area of medical research,
or to invest a portfolio in growth stocks instead of other more secure
but less-income-producing securities. The repercussions of these
activities are perhaps less dramatic than corporate activities be-
cause they are somewhat less visible, certainly less immediate, and
probably more difficult to declare necessarily right or wrong for
society. Nonetheless, these activities, like corporate activities, rep-
resent an ordering of priorities that ultimately becomes society's
ordering. Collectively, this ordering involves the expenditure of bil-
lions of dollars. The decisions are made by private individuals cho-
sen, not by the public, but by other private individuals. Therefore,
while the influence exerted by foundations on society through grants
and investments is not of the same nature as the influence of giant
corporations, it is certainly of similar importance.
Sensitivity to the uncontrolled power of private foundations and
the corresponding interest in placing foundations under public con-
trol is not a passing concern. It dates back at least to the beginning
'I See id.
,u See C. STONE, WHEEm THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
(1975).
I' See Chayes, The Modem Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN Socnr 25 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
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of this century, when the large charitable foundations were first
being formed to absorb the great wealth of the industrial magnates
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. When John D.
Rockefeller sought a corporate charter from Congress in 1910 for the
private foundation he sought to establish, he ran into stiff resis-
tance. Congressional debate produced proposed restrictions that
would have limited the assets of the foundation and the founda-
tion's rights to accumulate income. The proposals also included a
congressional option to terminate the proposed foundation's life
after one hundred years. Most significant, the election of the foun-
dation's trustees was to be subject to veto by a majority vote of a
collected group of public and private officials that included the
President of the United States, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and
the presidents of five prestigious American universities.' 6
Even with these restrictions, congressional resistance to the per-
petuation of Rockefeller's wealth and influence was so great that he
withdrew the application for federal incorporation and instead ob-
tained a state charter in New York. 37 The restrictions of the pro-
posed federally incorporated foundation contained the rudiments of
a selection process for trustees that would have involved an element
of public input.'3 Within half a decade, a selection committee very
similar in nature to the one proposed for the Rockefeller Foundation
was instituted in conjunction with the Cleveland Foundation, the
nation's first community foundation. This committee, composed of
both public and institutional officials, was not limited merely to
disapproving the selections of others. It could select trustees for the
foundation's committee in charge of distributions. 3' Thus models
exist that give society control over foundations' ability to order so-
ciety's priorities.
B. Public Determination of the Public Welfare
Beyond arguments based upon concern with the wealth and influ-
ence of foundations, a more basic reason exists for suggesting the
need for public input into the selection of the foundation's govern-
ment. All significant private foundations have as their ultimate goal
a desire to benefit the public. The foundation holds its funds in trust
I3m See W. NmLSEN, supra note 47, at 51.
' Id. at 52.
I's See id. at 51.
,' See Sugarman, supra note 22, at 1689-90.
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for the welfare of the public, and our society takes as axiomatic that
the public can best determine what will be of public benefit. A
primordial tenet of our society and our government is faith in the
ability of citizens to regulate their own welfare and not to have it
regulated for them. Such a tenet would not lead to the conclusion
that foundations must be administered by the government but
rather that the public must have an input in their governance. The
pluralism offered to society by activities of foundations need not be
sacrificed in accommodating the goal of input by the public. Provid-
ing the public with a role in selecting governors of foundations will
not subject those foundations to the yoke of government influence.
Indeed, it might well serve to legitimize their independence. 40 Foun-
dations can speak with a voice that responds to public needs, as
determined by the public, while still maintaining a distinctly non-
governmental outlook.'
C. Public Administration of Public Funds
Many erroneously regard funds of foundations as private funds
and feel that the donor of these funds should be able to determine
who will administer them by using a self-perpetuating private
board. The assertion that donors or their appointees should have a
perpetual and decisive influence on who governs the foundations is
symptomatic of an overall philosophy of foundations that regards
the foundation's assets as private funds still within the domain of
the donor's estate.' When the late J. Howard Pew, then senior
member of the Pew family, was asked why the Pew Memorial Trust
never issued any report to the public (it remains today probably the
most secretive of any significant private foundation), he shouted:
"I'm not telling anybody anything. It's my money, isn't it?"''
Regarding funds placed in trust for the public as private funds
decades after initial donation is inconceivable for two reasons.44
First, foundation assets have been committed to public consump-
tion, and the public should have a voice in determining how they
will be consumed. One reasonably could question whether the
Rockefeller brothers have greater justification than the public to
'"See pp. 819-20 infra.
" See pp. 821-32 infra.
" For further discussion of those who criticize external imposition of responsiveness to the
public, see pp. 829-32 infra.
"1 W. NmsEN, supra note 47, at 126.
"I See generally note 16 supra.
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decide the ultimate disposition of the assets of the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund thirty-seven years after dedication of the initial as-
sets to the public benefit.' Unfortunately, even in those instances
in which the control of the original donor has lapsed, as has appar-
ently happened with the Ford Foundation,"' the self-selecting pro-
cess for trustees still bars the public from input into the governance
of foundations.
Second, a significant portion of the assets administered and ulti-
mately distributed by foundations are in their hands rather than in
the federal treasury's coffers because of the favorable tax treatment
accorded foundations."7 Through charitable deductions and exemp-
tions from income tax, foundations have been able to amass funds
greatly in excess of the amount that would have been available if
no deduction for charitable giving existed or if foundations had to
pay taxes on their earnings comparable to the taxes paid by corpora-
tions or trusts. To the extent that a federal subsidy has existed,
trustees are administering funds of a public nature that exceed the
original funds of the donor plus earnings."8 This is another reason
why foundations' funds should be managed by trustees as to whose
selection the public has had its say.
D. Internal Administrative Efficiencies
Guaranteeing that foundations governed by publicly selected
trustees will operate more efficiently or more creatively or more
productively than foundations managed by self-selected boards may
be impossible. To begin with, these values are probably incapable
of measurement. 19 Moreover, advocates on both sides argue the
advantages of their preferred form of governance in terms of internal
efficiencies of operation.
Observations made earlier,"4' however, if they do not demonstrate
a number of internal efficiencies that would arise from public selec-
14 See generally text accompanying note 126 supra.
See generally Weymouth, supra note 31, at 22, col. 1.
'7 See pp. 795-802 supra.
" Charitable deductions for contributions to private foundations constitute an exception
to the general rule in taxation that "no deduction is permitted for a contribution until the
donor separates himself from the ownership of the assets donated." J. TAuB, supra note 29,
at 192.
" See J. NAsON, supra note 93, at 32. After stating that "[n]o study along these lines has
as yet been undertaken," the author then goes on to place the burden of proof with the critics
of the present system. Id.
10 See pp. 806-07, 812 supra.
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tion of trustees, strongly suggest them. Both the understaffed foun-
dation and the foundation controlled by its staff are malfunctions
that would be less likely to occur with public selection of trustees.
The trustees' obligation to enhance the public welfare would be
made more apparent in a system where the public selects those
trustees. Fulfillment of that obligation requires adequate staffing
for development of programs, allocation of grants, and investment
and also requires the preservation of lines of managerial authority
running from the trustee to the staff.15
Even assuming that a foundation governed by a publicly selected
board would operate neither more nor less efficiently than one man-
aged by a self-selected board, external benefits associated with a
publicly selected board tip the balance in favor of such a governing
structure. Basic societal values dictate that the public must have a
role in determining what the needs of society are and what the
priorities should be for satisfying those needs. The very act of allow-
ing society a role in deciding how funds committed to society's
benefit will be spent in itself provides an external good to society
that transcends the question of which form of government is most
efficient or creative. That external benefit is the fulfillment of so-
ciety's need to be in control of its own welfare. That benefit thrusts
on the proponents of the co-optive system the burden of demonstrat-
"I One could find more cause for reticence in calling for a restructuring if one could demon-
strate that the efficiency of the present system might be sacrificed in the process. An exami-
nation of the record, however, does not counsel such reticence. First, as previously noted, see
text accompanying notes 117-18 supra, the perpetuation of the donor's control has caused
many significant foundations to follow an imprudent policy of investment, which in turn
results in a lack of diversity in portfolio holdings. Second, only a small proportion of the very
largest foundations have developed the kind of administrative staff essential to the wise and
beneficial distribution of millions of dollars in grants. See note 114 supra and accompanying
text. Third, under the present governing structure, a minimal amount of direction filters
down from the trustees, who have been designated to champion the public welfare, to the
staff, who are supposed to put the foundation's programs into operation. See notes 129-30
supra and accompanying text. Fourth, foundations typically have achieved a quite unimpres-
sive investment record. The Peterson Commission in 1970 concluded "that the investment
performance of foundations is below par, and perhaps significantly so." PETmSON CoMM'N
RE'oRT, supra note 9, at 75. The Commission emphasized that society as a whole is being
shortchanged by this "lackluster management," which necessarily works to limit funds avail-
able to potential grantees by hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Id. Fifth, foundations
even appear to be lax in their efforts to determine the effectiveness of their grants. Forty-one
percent of all foundations have no follow-up program to analyze how their awards are being
utilized, although 72% do require some form of reporting concerning past performance for
further installment payments of grants. Id. at 91. An astounding 91% of all foundations
require no auditing of expenditures by grantees. Id. In light of the foregoing, any argument
against tinkering with the present governing structure of foundations to preserve the adminis-
trative benefits of that system would be untenable.
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ing the superiority of their form of government.1 52
Another external benefit would accrue from the effect of the pub-
lic on the composition of boards. - Public influence on the process of
selecting trustees undoubtedly would lead to a greater diversifica-
tion of boards, which presently suffer from a high degree of homo-
geneity. As previously noted, 1 3 the need for eliminating this same-
ness of personality has been a basic conclusion of virtually every
study of foundations conducted within the last decade. Including
the public in the selection process is the most direct means of ac-
complishing this end.
E. The Legitimizing Function of Public Input
The least controversial argument in support of public selection of
trustees is the legitimizing function served by involving the public
in governance of foundations. A recurring theme in much of the
literature is the breadth and frequency of the attacks on founda-
tions' policies. Foundations have been accused alternatively of
being too radical and not radical enough and have been the subject
of several major critical congressional hearings since World War
I1.1" Charitable nonprofit institutions as a whole incur an attitude
ranging from skepticism to hostility among three important seg-
ments of American society. Blue collar workers, the "underclass for
whom George Wallace has great appeal," and activists in political
and environmental fields all possess varying degrees of resentment
for the private nonprofit sector due to their aversion for elitism,
their sense of exclusion from participation in governing foundations,
their perception of the "ruling elite's disdain" for them, and their
sense that foundations are unresponsive to their needs. 5  Addition-
ally, many educated and politically minded individuals view the
nonprofit sector as "a denial of their notions of equity, democratic
participation, and accountability."'56
The fears of and resentment toward what are viewed as powerful
I52 But see note 149 supra.
J' See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
"' E.g., Hearings on the Role of Private Foundations in Today's Society and a Review of
the Impact of Charitable Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on the Support and
Operation of Private Foundations Before the Subcomm. on Foundations of the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); Tax Reform 1969: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means (pt. 1), 91st Cong., 1st Seas. (1969).
H Levy & Nielsen, AnAgenda For The Future, in 2 RESEARmCH PAPmis, supra note 4, at 1029,
1056-57.
"I Id. at 1057.
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elitists could be dissipated by a governing structure that provided
for the public's inclusion in selecting trustees. Giving the public its
say need not lead to less innovation or less undertaking of enter-
prises. Once the role of publicly selected trustees is defined, they
would be as capable of making the same commitments toward ex-
panding the horizons in education, arts, health, science, and na-
tional and international political studies as are self-selected trust-
ees. In addition, because such trustees would not be chosen in a
process that excluded the public, they would not have to struggle
to overcome public hostility toward elitism and would be ensured a
greater degree of acceptability.
VI. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR GOVERNING FOUNDATIONS
A final reason for including the public in the process of selecting
trustees is the ready availability of alternative models for gover-
nance that do involve active public participation, some of which
have already been adopted successfully by various foundations.
A. Limitations on the Foundation's Life
One approach to eliminating the self-perpetuating character of
boards is to limit the length of a foundation's life or to terminate a
foundation's tax-exempt status at the end of a specified number of
years. A number of donors have created private foundations with
stipulations that their life be limited to a specified number of years.
Concerned with the dangers posed by a foundation with an indefi-
nite existence, Julius Rosenwald established the Julius Rosenwald
Fund with the direction that all the income and principal of the
Fund be expended within twenty-five years of the death of the foun-
der. 1
57
The concept of limiting a foundation's life to combat self-
perpetuating power has attracted some congressional interest as
well. The Senate Committee on Finance passed an amendment to
the 1969 Tax Reform Act that would have placed a forty year limit
on the period of tax exemption of any private foundation.' 8 By that
time, the foundation was to have distributed all its assets or to have
'"7 See F. ANDREws, supra note 15, at 55-56. Two other ways to limit a foundation's life are
to set a specific date for termination or to have it end within a certain period after incorpora-
tion. See id. at 103-04.
"' See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 2027, 2052-53.
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become a public charity.'59 If the foundation had made neither the
distribution nor the conversion, it was to be taxed as a corporation
or a trust, depending upon its status. The Finance Committee's
amendment was aimed at curbing perpetual influence by the donor,
an important theme in the proposals that the Treasury Department
presented to Congress when the legislators first began their delibera-
tions on the Tax Reform Act of 1969.160 One proposal recommended
that donors and related persons be limited to twenty-five percent
representation on any board after the first twenty-five years of the
foundation's life.' The Finance Committee's amendment, clearly
going beyond the original Treasury proposals, was ultimately de-
feated by what one journalist described as "[a]ggressive founda-
tion lobbying.' 162 But the problem to which this proposal addressed
itself remained.
Self-terminating foundations and legislative proposals to limit
the lives of foundations are responses to the problem of the self-
perpetuating influence of foundations. Those approaches, however,
may go too far. Terminating a foundation's life after a predeter-
mined number of years effectively denies society whatever benefits
experience can bring to managing foundations. A preordained ter-
mination negates the benefits of a developed and experienced staff,
of tested and perhaps revised program goals, and of expertise in
investment. Solutions to the problems of foundations should at-
tempt to excise the disadvantages of the present governing struc-
tures without removing the advantages gained through maturity
and experience. For termination to be a sensible solution to self-
perpetuation, less drastic methods of confronting the problem would
have to be unavailable. Alternatives, however, do exist that allow
for public input into the selection of trustees, eliminating the unde-
sirable factor of self-perpetuation but permitting foundations and
society to benefit from experience.
B. Three Models of Public Input
1. Public Officials Selected in Other Capacities Serving as
Trustees of Foundations
One model for public selection of trustees would consist of tapping
the benefits of an already existing system of selection of representa-
For an understanding of the term "public charity," see note 23 supra.
"H See generally notes 1-11 supra and accompanying text.
" See JoiNT COMM. REPORT, supra note 1, at 305.
"2 C. WELLES, supra note 117, at 55.
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tives by the public. Such a model would require that trustees of
foundations come from the ranks of publicly elected and, perhaps,
appointed officials. The governing documents of significant private
foundations could indicate which positions would be drawn upon to
provide public representation on the foundation's board. Officials
representing all segments of the electorate, from high-level adminis-
trative officials of national, state, and local governments, to public
service administrators and school board officers, could be potential
trustees. Obviously, the size and intended impact of the foundation
would have a bearing on the level of the officials that might be
designated. Thus foundations with a regional impact might limit
themselves to officials chosen in state or countywide elections. Once
the administrative, judicial, legislative, or other body from which
the appointee is to come determined that the designation was ac-
ceptable, then the official duties arising from the designated pubic
position would be understood to include serving as a trustee on the
board of the specified foundation. To a certain extent, public ap-
proval of the officials' potential or past performance as trustees
would be reflected in their initial selection to and retention in office.
Most important, the foundation would be managed by persons se-
lected by the public for their abilitites in and commitment to serv-
ing the public.
Officials connected with publicly supported institutions, includ-
ing public universities and hospitals, might also be acceptable can-
didates for trusteeships. The public's role in selecting these institu-
tional officials, however, might be more tenuous than its role in
selecting normal representatives. Further, these officials, as repre-
sentatives of institutions that might well be recipients of founda-
tions' grants, would introduce an otherwise absent element of con-
flict of interest to the foundation's board. This problem could
largely be avoided by designing appropriate procedures to disqualify
trustees from voting on particular issues in which they have an
interest.
A governing model incorporating officials elected in other capaci-
ties to serve as trustees, while attractive in terms of providing direct
input by the public in selection of trustees, admittedly suffers from
some impracticalities in other regards, making it the least attractive
alternative. Initially, it opens up a range of conflicts for the officials
who must wear two hats and who at times may be caught between
competing policy goals..Conflicts might develop over how time is to
be allocated between the two positions. A legitimate concern might
arise as to potential politicizing of the board of trustees, which could
[Vol. 64:779
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result in party affiliations or political stances becoming the bases
of decisions by the foundation's management.
While these impracticalities detract from the desirability of this
model, they seem no more severe than those arising from the con-
flicts that presently exist in both government and foundations. Cur-
rently, many public officials successfully perform two roles in serv-
ing specific community interests while still functioning as govern-
mental officials. Furthermore, few trustees today work solely as
trustees. One easily can find conflicts of allegiance and roles among
the investment bankers, corporate officers, lawyers, and even aca-
demics who serve on today's boards.' On balance, these factors,
coupled with the positive benefits of public selection, militate for
this model instead of the present system.
2. Selection of Trustees by Public Officials
A variation of the first model, and one that has been proven
successful if judged by its continued and frequent application, is a
selection process in which public officials, rather than serving as
trustees, select the trustees. This model has the advantage of remov-
ing some of the potential conflicts in roles and time obligations
presented by the first model. Furthermore, it allows public officials
to select trustees who might have particular expertise that would be
attractive for foundations, such as a sophisticated knowledge of
investments, familiarity with the needs of charities, a background
in science or education, experience in the arts, or similar creden-
tials.'" At the same time, the actual trustee is removed one step
further from involvement in the political arena, thus minimizing the
likelihood of politicization of the board. While the public would be
selecting the selectors instead of the trustees, this procedure has
been a traditionally acceptable mode of public control over govern-
ment in our society. The public official making the selection will be
held responsible for his choice by the electorate just as he is for other
exercises of his official authority, but he need not be held responsi-
ble for each specific act of discretion of his appointee. As a result,
this alternative provides public accountability for selection of
trustees without transforming each decision of the foundation into
a political issue.
'0 See text accompanying notes 115-18 supra.
" This expertise also would help solve the problem of control by the staff. See generally
notes 129.30 supra and accompanying text.
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This model has been applied with particular frequency to com-
munity foundations. The first community foundation came into ex-
istence in 1914 with the goal of eliminating the "dead-hand control"
of the donor. 65 Whereas the investment decisions of the community
foundation do not have any public input because the funds typically
are managed by the trust department of a bank, the allocation of
grants is made by a distribution committee primarily selected by
a group of public and institutional figures representative of the
community that the foundation is intended to serve. Community
foundations have found that "public confidence can be obtained
by structures that provide for a broader participation or represen-
tation in the apparatus of the community foundation."' Com-
munity foundations maintain programs of respectable size, dis-
tributing in 1973 $60,000,000 in grants and maintaining assets of
$1,150,000,000.67 Community foundations, like private foundations,
actively develop programs and establish goals rather than serve
solely as funding sources to be tapped by charities. Their distribu-
tion committees, selected by public officials, operate as innovatively
and as adventurously as the co-optively selected boards of private
foundations, as is illustrated by the various broad programs of social
research funded by community foundations. '68 Viewed separately or
in the aggregate, these programs are virtually indistinguishable
from programs generated by private foundations.
Other foundations, including a number of governmental organiza-
tions, have operated effectively with public officials selecting their
trustees. Although these foundations are not entirely analogous to
private foundations, being actual government agencies and operat-
ing out of an annual budget of government funds rather than an
endowment, they deal with the same questions in allocating grants
as private foundations. For instance, the National Science Founda-
tion, established in 1950 by an Act of Congress' with the purpose
of initiating and supporting research in the physical and other sci-
ences, has its policies set by a board of twenty-four members ap-
See generally Sugarman, supra note 22.
" Id. at 1691.
17 Id.
,' Some of the many examples include: the Cleveland Foundation's landmark study of the
criminal justice system in Cleveland in the 1920's, the New Hampshire Charitable Fund's
recently established fund to assist in the preservation of open spaces, and the New Haven
Foundation's help in planning, evaluating, and funding a corrective program to establish
community-based residences for criminal offenders. See id. at 1698-99.
" National Science Foundation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-507, 64 Stat. 149 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1881 (1976)).
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pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate.7 0 The President is directed to appoint members who have dis-
tinguished records in several enumerated fields of science and to
give consideration to nominees submitted by the National Academy
of Sciences and four different associations of colleges and universi-
ties.'"' This technique combines selection by public officials with
identification of potential nominees by interest groups that could
provide valuable advice.
A procedure similar to the one employed in selecting the govern-
ing board of the National Science Foundation also was established
in 1965 for the National Endowment for the Arts and The National
Endowment for the Humanities." Each endowment is governed by
a chairman appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate.173 These chairmen are in turn advised by councils also
selected by the President.7 4 As with the National Science Founda-
tion, the purpose of the National Endowments for the Arts and
Humanities is essentially identical to those of private foundations.
Even though the two types of foundations are not entirely structur-
ally analogous, private foundations could adopt the selection pro-
cess of governmental foundations.
Actually, no need exists to look as far afield as community and
governmental foundations to observe working models of a selection
process utilizing public officials. The Trexler Foundation, a private
foundation distributing the income from its $22,000,000 portfolio
locally for recreational and charitable purposes in Allentown, Penn-
sylvania and surrounding Lehigh County, '75 is governed by a board
of trustees selected solely by a public official. The last will and
testament of Harry Trexler, executed in 1929, directed that vacan-
cies in the original donor-appointed board of trustees would be filled
by the Orphans' Court of Lehigh County."' A degree of ultimate
responsibility for operating the Trexler Foundation thus rests with
a public official. The Northwest Area Foundation, which distrib-
,70 42 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (1976).
, Id. § 1863(c).
,7 National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, 79
Stat. 845 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-960 (1976)).
'7 20 U.S.C. §§ 954(b)(1), 956(b)(1) (1976).
74 Id. §§ 955(b), 957(b).
"I See Trexler Foundation, Five Year Report 1971-1975 and 40 Year Review 1935-1975, at
11-29 (1975) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
171 Last Will and Testament of' Harry C. Trexler 12 (April 15, 1929) (copy on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
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uted nearly $3,800,000 in 1976, similarly has its five trustees ap-
pointed by a state district court in Minnesota.
1 7
The use of officials accountable to the public for selecting trustees
is neither entirely foreign to private foundations nor demonstrably
impractical. It offers a workable alternative to a selection process
that otherwise guarantees the self-perpetuation of the influence of
the initial board, a lack of diversity, and exclusion of the public
from the determination of its own self-interest.
3. Selection of Trustees by Public Officials from a Prescreened
Pool
A limitation of the previous two models lies in their reliance on
either the public official's qualifications to serve as a trustee or the
public official's ability to select qualified trustees. Furthermore, the
only influence given to those groups involved in and affected by the
vitality of foundations-the staffs of foundations and donees-is
their proportionate share of the public's influence. A third alterna-
tive, however, provides public input in the selection process while
also assuring that qualified trustees will be selected and that af-
fected interest groups could have special input. Under this alterna-
tive, public officials would select trustees from a prescreened pool.
The composition of this pool would be determined by a national
commission established by Congress to operate perpetually for the
exclusive purpose of selecting candidates for trusteeships. The
members of this commission would be selected by the President on
a nonpartisan basis with the consent of Congress, much as the
boardl of governmental foundations are presently selected. 178 The
task of the national commission would be to select a pool of qualified
poten~tial trustees, and from this pool at a later stage predetermined
public officials would make nonpartisan selections to fill the needs
of various foundations. In essence, the plan would operate very simi-
larly to the "Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan" developed by the
American Bar Association for selection of the judiciary.'79 As an
In See F. ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 46-47. Actually the trustees, selected by the court, in
turn appoint directors who run the foundation-corporation.
'" See notes 169-72 supra and accompanying text. The Filer Commission recommended the
establishment of a national commission on the nonprofit sector to be appointed by a process
that relied on the discretion of the President and his initial appointees. The purpose of this
commission, however, was limited to serving as a type of permanent protector and observa-
tion body rather than determining candidates for trusteeships. See FILER COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 4, at 191-93.




optional arrangement, a specific portion of the pool could be se-
lected from members of each of the previously mentioned interest
groups to augment the representation of those intimately involved
and immediately affected. When the actual selection is made, rough
guidelines could be established to ensure that these interest groups,
as well as the public-in general, are represented on individual
boards.
This third alternative has a triple value. It would provide for
public input in selection of trustees, a high degree of expertise of the
individual trustee, and optional representation of those operating or
immediately affected by the foundation. It thus retains the benefits
of the two previous models and eliminates the problems associated
with limiting the foundation's life.
C. Implementation of the Models
If one of these three alternative models were implemented for
private foundations, it could be phased in gradually by means of a
five-year exemption. Such a provision allows the donor or his ap-
pointees to control the board of trustees during the first five years
of the foundation's existence. This grace period serves two func-
tions. First, it would placate partially those who view the co-optive
system as a necessary incentive to encourage the wealthy to estab-
lish foundations. Second, it would provide the donor with an oppor-
tunity for inaugurating projects that later might be deemed worthy
of continuation when the foundation is turned over to public con-
trol. A limited period of control by the donor would not entail the
self-perpetuation of influence of the present co-optive system, yet
it would allow donors the chance to set a good example and supply
them with some sense of control over the destiny of their dona-
tions. 80 In addition, control could come from the delineation of pur-
l" Theoretically, one might argue that as long as the publicly selected trustees enjoyed
majority control of any board, no need would exist to eliminate entirely the influence of the
donor or his appointees. Indeed, if it developed that donors' incentives were undermined
severely by the eventual elimination of the donor and his appointees from the board, a
compromise position allowing the donor to retain minority representation on the board could
be formulated. As an initial proposition, however, the retention of any seats on the board by
the donor would seem unattractive. Essentially, such retention would cut against the argu-
ments developed above for public impact in the selection process. In split decisions among
the publicly selected trustees, the donor's trustees would hold swing votes. In other instances,
a donor's representitives might wield a disproportionate influence on the board, attributable
to either an assumed superiority in being able to carry out the original purposes of the
foundation or the deference that the other trustees show them because of their relation to the
donor. One commentator has noted an analogous influence that the founder-donor exerts on
1978]
Virginia Law Review
pose in the documents creating the foundation.
To achieve this goal, governmental compulsion would not be nec-
essary. The federal government would merely need to extend the
existing "carrot" approach that it already uses to encourage
"public" foundations. The present tax system favors foundations
other than private, nonoperating foundations, such as community
foundations, by providing that a higher percentage of a donor's
contribution base will be deductible for donations made to "public"
foundations rather than to private foundations.' 1 Furthermore,
public foundations are not subject to the four percent excise tax on
net investment income as are private foundations.' 2 The same justi-
fications that permit encouraging the development of community
foundations over private foundations through the tax code could be
applied to a policy favoring the development of private foundations
with publicly selected trustees over private foundations without
such trustees. 83 The differential in tax treatment between private
foundations having'publicly selected trustees and private founda-
tions having co-optively selected trustees might need to be more
marked than the differential in the present treatment of private and
public foundations to assure that the desired outcome will be at-
tained. 14 The differential could be created through a combination
of differences in the deductions allowable to donors and in the
exemption from income taxation available to the foundations.
Not all private foundations need to be covered by this type of tax
legislation. Certainly, smaller private foundations, of somewhere
under $10,000,000 of assets, would not present the same concern
over their self-perpetuating influence because of their limited im-
trustees even after he disappears from the scene. That influence sometimes results in trustees
abandoning their own responsibility, attempting instead to adhere to a policy or supposed
policy of the donor. See A. ZURCHER, supra note 21, at 21, 30. Thus, absent compelling
circumstances, the risk of subjecting the publicly selected trustees to the potential influence
of the donor-selected trustees outweighs any benefits associated with preserving representa-
tion of the donor on the board.
"I See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
M See I.R.C. § 4940.
"I The Filer Commission has recommended the possible use of this "carrot" approach in
encouraging "independent" foundations, the boards of which would be restricted to a minor-
ity representation of the donor, the donor's family, and the donor's associates. See FLER
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 172-73. The Filer Commission's model of an "independent"
foundation rejects public selection of trustees and merely requires limitations on representa-
tion of the donor.
Perhaps the present differential would be sufficient, for some indications can be found
that the present tax treatment of public and private foundations has been a significant




pact on society. Nationally, the aggregate number of foundations for
which trustees would need to be selected runs no higher than 400,
necessitating a total of perhaps 1,700 trustees.'5 Of course, only a
small portion of these positions would need to be filled in any one
year.
Moreover, the fact that many of the trustees of community foun-
dations are selected in a manner involving public input suggests
that the same approach should be feasible for selecting trustees for
private foundations. Certainly enough qualified people can be found
in the ranks of businessmen, academicians, former government offi-
cials, and the like to staff these foundations with competent and
dedicated trustees chosen in a process including public input. Pub-
lic selection of trustees should be accompanied by public meetings
and public minutes of those meetings. To evaluate the performance
of trustees, the frequently secretive procedures of foundations
should be opened to the examination of the public.' 6
D. The Counterarguments
As stated earlier,'87 those who study foundations generally recog-
nize a need to broaden the representation of the boards of trustees.
At the same time, one finds that attempts to broaden this repre-
sentation by any external selection process meet resistance,'"" which
at times rises virtually to the level of a phobia. Consequently, the
means often proposed for broadening representation by these "inter-
nal diversifiers" is the placement of limitations on the number of
positions on the board that may be filled by the donor, the donor's
family, or associates of the donor.'
89
"I Approximately 400 foundations have assets of $10,000,000 or more, see FOUNDATION
CENTER, supra note 6, at xiii, and each private foundation has roughly 4.2 trustees, see J.
NASON, supra note 93, at 4 n.5.
' The Filer Commission has recommended that all grant-making organizations with an-
nual grants of $100,000 or more hold annual public meetings. See FILER COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 4, at 166.
N7 See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
IJ For example, the Filer Commission's proposal for "independent" foundations provided
broader representation by regulating the present selection process to limit control by the
donor and the donor's family. It stopped short of actually allowing the public to determine
its own preferences. See note 183 supra.
"I See, e.g., Stone, The Charitable Foundation: Its Governance, in 3 RESEARCH PAPERS,
supra note 4, at 1723, 1727-30. Professor Stone's thoughtfully developed proposals call for the
elimination of controlling influence on the board by the donor within seven and one-half years




What are the fears with external control of the selection process?
Basically, those opposing the concept of publicly selected trustees
express a concern over the need to preserve our society's pluralism
and the innovativeness of the private sector. Some believe that to
allow the public to be involved in selection of trustees would elimi-
nate the "other door" that fund-seekers have to knock on when
turned down by government. Former Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare Wilbur L. Cohen has stated:
[T]here are critical reasons for maintaining a vital balance of pub-
lic and private support for human services, not the least of which is
the continuing task of innovating in areas where public agencies
lack knowledge or are afraid to venture. . . The private sector is
[especially] adept at innovation and at providing the models
[that] government needs.110
Professor Stone propounds a very similar theme in urging the
avoidance of governmental regulation of the selection of boards. He
holds that the lack of diversity of foundation boards, "and especially
the fact that foundation boards are not democratically representa-
tive, are not necessarily faults. Indeed, these characteristics may be
virtues, since a foundation whose directors were chosen like legisla-
tors would present no real alternative to government support."''
These opponents of the external selection of trustees assume that
allowing public input will inevitably work to establish a mirror-
image of government. None of the three proposed models, however,
would serve to duplicate any particular branch of government either
in terms of the trustees selected or in the composition of their con-
stituency. The two models that utilize public officials to select
trustees would display no overlap between the personnel of govern-
ment and foundation. The model utilizing a prescreened pool can
be adapted effectively to provide representation to particular inter-
est groups, which precise representation would have no counterpart
in government. The model that recruits public officials to serve as
trustees would exhibit overlap, but it would occur by chance, re-
creating no specific branch of government.
Assuming that the constituency selecting trustees is identical to
the one electing governmental officials, this similarity of constituen-
cies should not result in governing structures that mirror each other,
"I Cohen, Some Aspects of Evolving Social Policy in Relation to Private Philanthropy, in
2 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 4, at 657, 660, quoted in FnELR COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4,
at 42 (bracketed material in original but not in reprinted version).
"I Stone, supra note 189, at 1730.
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especially where the governing bodies are intended to fulfill sub-
stantially different roles in our society. The fact that school boards
and other local governmental entities are elected by the same popu-
lace does not imply that these bodies will possess identical outlooks.
Officials of these bodies are selected with different criteria in mind,
and their official obligations commit them to different policy ap-
proaches and positions. That same creativity and independence of
mind, arguably an integral part of the present private system of
selection, can just as readily be incorporated in the roles of publicly
selected trustees. Public selection of trustees will not transform
foundations into governmental agencies. Neither governmental
funding nor governmental staffing will characterize foundations
governed by publicly selected trustees.
Moreover, departure from a commitment to innovative ap-
proaches in serving the public welfare is unnecessary because such
commitment would be the basis upon which the trustees would be
selected. Their performance could be evaluated in terms of their
innovation and initiative. Such a requirement of innovation and
independence from government has been written into the descrip-
tions of the jobs of numerous publicly selected officials, from con-
sumer ombudsmen to officials of poverty programs to special prose-
cutors.
Excessive concern for any interference by government in founda-
tions' lives was noted by the Donee Group in a report prepared in
response to the Filer Commission's study. The Donee Group stated:
"This fear [of intervention] of government pervades the [Filer
Commission's] report . . . . [I]t is explicit in the refusal to accept
a greater role for government in governance, access and accountabil-
ity.' 9 2 The inference that any intrusion of regulation by the govern-
ment into the operations of foundations would result in a complete
subversion of the value of foundations to society almost attains the
stature of a "mythology '19 3 and is reflected in a general belief held
by personnel of foundations in the inferiority of government pro-
grams. Certain private social welfare agencies have adopted "the
convenient assumption that private sector programs intrinsically
were superior to those of government-more innovative, less bu-
reaucratic, more competently staffed." '94
Corresponding prejudices are held by governmental agencies in
' Donee Group, supra note 113, at 62.
,, See Levy & Nielsen, supra note 155, at 1038.
It Id.
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regard to agencies in the private sector."9 5 However strong the con-
viction may be, neither side's perceptions have been substantiated,
and at present they remain no more than prejudices. Recognition of
these myths is instructive when analyzing the private sector's asser-
tion that a selection process regulated by the government would
undermine the role presently played by private foundations in our
society. Because no corroboration has been offered for that position,
it is most likely a component of the mythology.
Finally, even if some degree of the pluralistic benefits that the
present selection process offers society is indeed lost by public selec-
tion of trustees, this percentage necessarily would be quite small.
The overall pluralistic nature of private foundations still would
remain. Donors could continue to dictate the specific purposes to
which the foundations' energies and funds are to be devoted in the
documents establishing the foundations. Although public input
would influence how those energies and funds are to be allocated
within the delineated purposes of the foundation, the determination
of the purpose of the foundation would remain with the donor.
VII. CONCLUSION
Assuming that implementation of a system of public selection of
trustees for private foundations involves no risk would be naive. In
the final analysis, one must weigh the costs and benefits of any
proposal. On the one side are the benefits to society of eliminating
the restrictive effects of a self-perpetuating board while simulta-
neously providing society with a tool to determine how the power
and influence of significant pools of wealth, established to serve
the welfare of society, shall indeed serve that society. This must be
balanced against whatever risks are inherent whenever an institu-
tion, to which we are accustomed, is modified. The risks presented
by the three proposed selection models, however, are minimal in
light of the magnitude of the problem. Given the purpose of founda-
tions-benefitting the public-and the lack of responsibility to the
public in their present organization, the ideals upon which our so-
ciety rests require public input in the selection of trustees.
15Id.
